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Among theories of criminal liability, two are polar opposites. On one
theory, or more accurately family of theories, society's license to punish the
offender derives from her dangerousness or wickedness. 1 On pure versions of
these theories wicked thoughts and plans unaccompamed by concrete acts fail
to be punishable only because the trier of fact would have insufficient evidence
to infer the appropriate level of personal dangerousness or depravity Such
theories are "subjective."
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I Dangerousness and wickedness are, of course, two different things. One may be
wicked for a discrete period of time without being the least bit dangerous after that time.
Indeed, one may be subjectively wicked and do things with the wickedest possible intent
without being dangerous at that time, if one's choice of means is incurably defective. The
wickedness version of subjectivism appeals to those theorists who have some mclination
towards retributivism. I take no exception to the claim that the wickedness of conduct is
properly a matter to be taken into account in assessing criminal liability. Intentional murder
is a more serious offense than criminally negligent homicide. Where the depravity theory
goes wrong is in taking wicked conduct to be a sufficient predicate for liability-even if that
conduct violates no one's rights.
The dangerousness version of the subjective theory is, I contend, further off the mark.
Dangerousness is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of liability. Indeed what
crime one is guilty of ought never to be a function of how dangerous one is. Dangerousness
ought enter m only at the punishment phase, and then under strict constraints.
Dangerousness versions of the subjective theory of criminal liability are, however, quite
popular among those of utilitarian bent. And conscious or unconscious utilitanans are in an
overwhelming majority among criminal law commentators and criminal justice policy
makers.
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On the opposite theory, society's license to punish the offender derives
from her commission of criminal acts that actually impose upon society 2 In the
absence of these acts, we cannot justly punish the offender even if we know
with certainty that she is desperately wicked and dreadfully dangerous. This is
sometimes called an "objective" theory, but because that label can cover a great
deal of ground, I will refer to this theory, which I endorse, by the more
descriptive if less elegant phrase "imposition theory "
A theory is not "subjective" m the sense I have m mind merely because the
mental state of the offender is an element of liability In that weak sense we are
all subjectivists-so long as we recognize the propriety of distinguishing among
different degrees of homicide in terms of mental states. For the purposes of this
Article a theory is "purely subjective" if an act is not a necessary condition of
liability, and it is "subjective" if, for at least some offenses, an imposition upon
discrete victims or society is not a necessary condition of liability
I doubt that there is anyone who holds a pure version of a subjective
theory A purist would insist that the criminal act is only of evidentiary
significance. In principle a machine that perfectly assessed subjective depravity
or predicted future criminality could substitute for the criminal act as the
predicate for criminal liability Some may eschew this extreme view only
because they believe such a machine to be impossible. Most would, I hope,
concede that such a machine, even if it were possible, ought not be used for
reasons of justice. In the end, this concession will take the modem subjectivist
further than he may have anticipated. My present purpose, however, is only to
avoid seeming to overstate my opponents' initial commitments.
Still, if there may be no "pure" subjectivists, the criminal justice
community has taken on board a very heavy load of subjectivism. The Model
Penal Code, for example, although it purports to forbid "conduct that
unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm," apparently
sees as the purpose of punishment "to subject to public control persons whose
conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit crimes." 3 Correspondingly,
the official commentators concluded that "the primary purpose of punishing
attempts is to neutralize dangerous individuals and not to deter dangerous
acts." 4 The "substantial step" towards completion of the crime required by the
2 See, e.g., 1 EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD
LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 235 (1873); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of
Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequasite for Cnrnunal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV 266
(1975). Both Livingston and Robinson dilute their objectivism by understanding all attempts
to create social mjunes. LIVINGSTON, supra at 19; Robinson, supra at 269-71; see also
mnfra note 22.
3 MODELPENAL CODE § 1.02 (1)(a), (b) (1985).
4 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, Comment at 323 (1985); see also WAYNE R. LA
FAvE & AuSTIN W ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 506 (2d ed. 1986); GLANVILLE
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Model Penal Code is satisfied by "anything which, under the circumstances as
[the defendant] believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a
substantial step "5
Commentators are so nearly unanimous that the key to criminal liability
ought to be the dangerousness or depravity of the offender, rather than the
extent of his actual imposition upon his victim or society, that this subjective
theory is sometimes simply called the "modem" theory 6
Proponents of subjective theories argue that it is irrational to take into
account whether an act actually imposed upon anyone.7 An offender may
demonstrate his dangerousness or depravity beyond any doubt without such
inposition, and it would defeat the purposes of the criminal law not to hold
such a one liable. The imposition theorist responds that, however much liability
nught prove socially useful, it would be fundamentally unjust. Because this is
the central dispute, crimes of attempt form a natural field of battle between
subjective theories and the Imposition theory
I want to emphasize, however, that what is at stake here is not simply a
matter of theories of attempts, though harmless attempts-attempts that impose
no risk-focus the dispute in a particularly sharp way What is at stake is the
general theory of criminal liability Subjective theories and the imposition
theory are fundamentally different ways of understanding what it is for conduct
to be criminal. The imposition theory has its roots in retributive justice. Those
of the subjective theories are primarily in utilitarianism.
The objective theory has differing consequences from subjective theories
throughout the substantive criminal law including for such matters as
punishment theory, victimless crimes, felony-murder, misdemeanor-
manslaughter, conspiracy, possession offenses, and even criminal causation.
Except for a brief excursion into punishment theory, this article ignores these
other matters to concentrate on the pivotal test case of attempts. My hope is
thereby to show that there is some plausibility, after all, to an approach that has
been all but universally rejected by academic commentators.
Hart puts forcefully the subjectivist complaint against an imposition
requirement:
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 632 (2d ed. 1961); Donald Smart, The
Actus Reus in Attempts, 1970 CRIM. L. REV 505, 508.
5 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1985); cf. [English] Criminal Attempts Act, 1981
Pt. I, § 1, 3 ("In any case where-(a) apart from this subsection a person's intention would
not be regarded as having amounted to an intent to commit an offence; but (b) if the facts of
the case had been as he believed them to be, his intention would be so regarded,
then, he shall be regarded as having had an intent to commit that offence.").
6 See, e.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 4, at 510.
7 Stephen I. Schulhofer, Attempt, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 97
(Sanford H. Kadish ed. 1983).
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The almost universal tendency m punishing to discriminate between attempts
and completed crimes rests, I think, on a version of the retributive theory
which has permeated certain branches of English law, and yet has on occasion
been stigmatized even by English judges as illogical To many people
such a theory of punishment seems to confuse punishment with compensation,
the amount of which should indeed be fixed m relation to harm done. Even if
punishment and compensation were not distinguished m primitive law, many
think that this is no excuse for confusing them now. Why should the accidental
fact that an intended harmful outcome has not occurred be a ground for
punishing less a criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally wicked?8
Even those who question subjective theories sometimes cede them the high
ground of rationality For example, Fletcher defends taling tmposition into
account in the following somewhat defensive way-
Modernists hold to arguments of rational and meaningful punishment. Despite
what we might feel, the modernist insists, reason demands that we limit the
criminal law to those factors that are within the control of the actor. The
occurrence of harm is beyond his control and therefore ought not to have
weight in the definition of cnme and fitting punishment. 9
Fletcher continues by stating:
The relevance of the victim's suffering in the criminal law poses a serious
hurdle to the struggle for reasoned principles m the law. Generations of
theorists have sought to explain why we punish actual homicide more severely
than attempted homicide, the real spilling of blood more severely than the
unrealized intent to do so. Our combined philosophical work has yet to
generate a satisfactory account of why the realization of harm aggravates the
penalty. Yet the practice persists m every legal system of the Western world.
We cannot adequately explain why harm matters, but matter it does.10
Despite Fletcher's misgivings, I submit that there is nothing mysterious or
terribly difficult about an imposition theory It resonates with considerations
that have long been staples of the jurisprudence of crime and punishment-
legality, responsibility, autonomy, and "proportionality " There is surely some
initial plausibility to the proposition that free people should not become
crimially liable unless they trespass upon someone else's moral space, that is
unless they impose in some way Similarly, there is at least some intuitive
support for the further proposition that free people ought not to acquire liability
for serious crimes unless they have imposed in some serious way The common
8 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSiBILirY 129-31 (1968).
9 GEORGE P FLErCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE 64 (1988).
10 Id. at 82-83.
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sense appeal of the imposition theory is reflected in the old common law, for
which there was no criminal liability for any unsuccessful attempt.I'
It will be the burden of the first half of this article to argue that the
imposition theory's initial plausibility is, in fact, well founded. In large part I
do this through arguing against subjective theories. Of course every argument
against the class of subjective theories is simultaneously an argument for the
imposition theory and vce versa inasmuch as I have defined the two to be
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Everyone who rejects the
requirement of an imposition for liability, and a sufficiently objective
imposition at that, I stuff together into the subjectivist pigeonhole.
In fact, despite the obviousness of the imposition theory, I have identified
no contemporary commentator who escapes consignment to the subjectivist
pigeonhole. That is not to say that no one in the recent past has argued for any
form of an imposition theory But the few who have argued for a requirement
of an imposition for criminal liability have slid back into subjectivism by
watering down what would count as an imposition.
Fletcher and Gross are prominent examples. 12 Fletcher concludes that to be
liable for an attempt "the actor must attempt an act punishable under the law,
and, further this attempt must be dangerous on its face." 13 Now if
dangerousness on its face is a matter of imposing an objective risk upon
someone, then Fletcher would qualify as a full fledged imposition theorist. At
some points, Fletcher seems to adopt the full fledged theory, explaining an act
that is dangerous on its face as "an objectively dangerous act that treads upon
the rights of others."14
Unfortunately, Fletcher backs away from this objective formulation,
sometimes taking it to be enough for "dangerousness on its face" that the act
"bespeaks" cruminality Watching the act would cause us to be "apprehensive
about the victim's welfare" even if we knew that on this particular occasion the
victim was in fact completely safe.' 5 No doubt the "bespeaking" formulation
appealed to Fletcher because of his previously developed concept of "manifest
11 By the "old" common law, I mean the English common law prior to Rex v.
Scofield, Cald. 397 (H.L.) (1784), m which case Lord Mansfield invented the law of
attempt. Prior to that case the English law "started from the principle that an attempt to do
harm is no offense." 2 FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 508 n.4 (2d ed. 1903). See generally, EUGENE MEEHAN, THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL AiTEMPr 8 (1984); Francis B. Sayre, Cnrnunal Attempts, 41 HARV L. REv
821, 822-37 (1928).
12 HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1979); George P Fletcher,
Constructing a Theory of Impossible Attempts, 5 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS Winter/Spring 1986
at53.
13 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 67
14 Id.
15 1d. at 64.
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criminality "16 Whatever its provenance, "bespeaking criminality" leads back
towards subjectivism, and thus towards results inconsistent with Fletcher's own
better arguments.17
Gross, too, starts on the right track in arguing that criminal liability
morally requires harm or "a true threat of harm." 18 Gross, however, like
Fletcher, quickly moves away from an imposition theory and back towards
subjectivism. It turns out that a threat of harm, for Gross, is not a matter of the
objective risk of harm, but rather of its "expectability" as measured by what
the actor has reason to believe. In fact, for Gross, the reason an actor has for
believing her act will be successful need not be a good reason or very much of
a reason at all. Gross, like Fletcher, would impose attempt liability for picking
an empty pocket, and for shooting into an empty bed, though the intended
victim was a thousand miles away 19 In addition Gross would, under certain
circumstances, impose attempt liability for receiving non-stolen goods or
concealing from customs non-dutiable lace.20 Gross is, of course, in good
company in defending these positions, but for that very reason can hardly count
as a thoroughgoing anti-subjectivist.
It is a measure of the hegemony of the subjective theory that its most
notable opponents have made such substantial comprormses in its favor. 21
Although I will make an occasional comment here as to the failure of Fletcher
or Gross to follow the path of the imposition theory, my arguments are
primarily addressed to those who have not yet found the trailhead-the
members of the great subjectivist consensus.
In the second part of this Article, I will sketch out one aspect of the
detailed structure of the imposition theory of criminal liability My concern
16 GEORGEP FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMiNAL LAW (1978).
17 For example, Fletcher contends that dead women and consenting women can be
targets of attempted rapes. The imposition theory, I argue, properly entails the opposite
conclusion. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
18 GROSS, supra note 12, at 194.
19 GROSS, supra note 12, at 215; Fletcher, supra note 12, at 57-59.
20 See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 12, at 209.
21 Robinson defends a strongly, indeed uniquely, objective theory with respect to
justification, arguing that the defense "should be available even to defendants who lack
knowledge of the justifying circumstances." Robinson, supra note 2, at 289. When it comes
to attempts Robinson is unwilling to accept the creation of risk as a predicate for liability.
He does, however, contend that attempts create a harm of an "intangible character" against
society, id. at 269, apparently by causing a "disturbance of the social order." Id. at 270
quoting JOHN W MAY, LAW OF CRIMES 191 (K. Sears & H. Weihofen eds., 4th ed.
1938). He seems comfortable with the possibility that even impossible attempts impose upon
society m this way, and with their being cnminalized by the legislature. Id. at 270-71. The
social disturbance caused by an impossible attempt, however, is surely little more than




there will be only with so much of that theory as is required to apply it to the
domain of attempts. In particular, I will show how my theory departs from the
old common-law position that there could be no liability for any attempt.
That is, I will give an account of "actual imposition" on which some
unsuccessful attempts to bring about criminal harm produce such impositions,
and some do not. Those that do not are the "harmless" attempts of this
Article's title. Attempts may be harmless either because they do not proceed far
enough to produce risk or because they would impose no risk even if pursued
through their last step. The latter attempts are "impossible," and they will be
the particular focus of Part II.
Let me anticipate with a few examples. Lying in wait for a victim who is
still some distance away is, I will argue, not yet an "attempt" at all, but even if
it were, it would be 'a harmless attempt because there is no immediate risk
imposed upon the victim until he comes within range. When he does come
within range, and is fired upon with live ammunition, there is an attempt, and
not a harmless one. Even if the shooter missed, the attempt was possible and
properly gives rise to liability because it did impose immediate risk upon the
intended victim. Firing a stage prop pistol and firing at a tree stump in the
mistaken belief it is a person are harmless attempts. There is no immediate
imposition. Similarly there is no risk, and hence ought not be attempt liability,
for spoomng what is in fact sugar out of an arsenic box into one's aunt's tea,
for buying goods m the mistaken belief they are stolen, for the smuggling of
lace in the mistaken belief it is dutiable, for picking an empty pocket,22 for
shooting into a bed believed on good grounds to be occupied, or for trying to
rape a deceased or secretly consenting victim.
Of course this all depends upon my being able to give a satisfactory
account of immediate, objective risk, but that account must await Part II. My
present concern is to show that there is enough good sense to the imposition
theory to warrant a more detailed examination of the concept of risk upon
which the theory depends for its account of attempts, harmful and harmless,
possible and impossible.
I. ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUBJECrIVISM AND FOR THE IMPOSITION
THEORY
I will here set out seven arguments in favor of the imposition theory of
attempts and against the modem subjective theory
22 Brian Hogan, another of the select group who are on record against subjectivism,
nonetheless sides with the subjectivists that there ought be attempt liability m empty pocket
cases. Brian Hogan, Attempting the Impossible and the Pnnctple of Legality, 135 NEW L.J.
454 (1985).
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The first argument is partially descriptive in character. It looks to the fact
that existing criminal codes are built upon the concept of imposition. Most
obvious is the fact that offenses are largely graded m terms of the seriousness
of their effects. In particular, the seriousness of the offense increases with the
size of the theft, the seriousness of the physical injury, and the degree of the
sexual imposition. Moreover, successful attempts, despite the complaints of
subjectivists, are almost always of higher grade than unsuccessful attempts. The
incompatibility of the subjective theory with these basic features of criminal
law is not just an apparent incompatibility
My second argument is that the subjective theory is radically incomplete.
There are fact situations in which subjectivism is committed to there being
cruinal liability, but for which it lacks the resources to specify the offense for
which the offender is liable.
For my third argument I draw upon the fact that the concept of criminal
liability is closely bound to that of criminal responsibility There is no liability
unless the offender is responsible for the creation of some condition. In the
end, only impositions have enough substance to count as such conditions.
The fourth argument is linguistic. It turns on the fact that ordinary usage
does not recognize as attempts two broad and important groups of cases that
count as attempts on subjectivist theories.
Political philosophy is the heart of my rather more extended fifth
argument, which deals with the first category of harmless attempts-those that
have not gone far enough to impose immediate risk. The argument focuses on
the value of individual autonomy and liberty The imposition theory leaves
more scope for individual liberty, and less for state coercion, than do its rivals.
In the course of establishing this, I will argue that the unposition theory is to be
preferred because the pure subjective theory is flatly and unquestionably
unacceptable in its treatment of liberty and autonomy and because there is no
tenable middle ground between the pure subjective theory and the pure
imposition theory In short, no satisfactory alternative to the imposition theory
is available.
Moreover, even if there were such an alternative, it would encounter grave
difficulties drawing the line between liability and nonliability Just what step is
it on the path from plan to executed crime that crosses the line? My sixth
argument is that the criterial verbal formulae of subjective theories are
inevitably far too vague to provide adequate notice. These theories, then, fall
short of minimal conditions of legality and due process.
My final, and weightiest, argument is one of retributive justice or fairness.
It would be fundamentally unfair for society to impose upon the individual in
the dramatic, serious, and stigmatizing fashion of the criminal law unless the
individual has done something that imposes upon society
[Vol. 53:10571064
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A. The Role of Impositon in the Codes
The crimnal law is not concerned with all immoral behavior. It is not even
concerned with all seriously immoral behavior. I would hazard that a great deal
of what parents do to children ought to count as seriously immoral because of
its long-term effects upon the children's lives. Effectively uncontrolled
television watching, for example, may severely limit a child's future potential.
It is, however, not crimnal to cripple the child's intellectual or emotional
development in this way, or in most of the ways parents have such effects.
Even depraved parenting, for example, the intentional and systematic
undermining of the child's sense of self-worth, is not criminal.
Such seriously inmoral, noncriminal behavior is not limited to the family
Teachers, supervisors, friends and lovers can, and do, impose psychic wounds
more serious than those of most assaults. Not even when done out of the
deepest depravity are these actions criminal, and no one proposes that they
ought to be. Were criminal law primarily directed at depravity or
dangerousness, it would be at least initially mysterious why so much dangerous
and depraved conduct is not criminal. Other institutions of society, prominently
including religions, have among their goals a far wider concern than has the
criminal law for reducing the general level of immoral conduct. Perhaps the
greatest paradox for the dangerousness version of subjectivism is that the most
dangerous among us, the criminally insane, are diverted from the criminal
justice system into institutions of mental health even when the acts they commit
would otherwise count as criminal offenses.
Of course criminal law does have a function of protecting our persons and
property, but its strong medicine is prescribed only under special
circumstances, and according to a logic that deemphasizes personal
dangerousness and, to a lesser extent, depravity as well.
If dangerousness controlled, it would be improper to grade intentional
assaults by the seriousness of the physical injury caused. Under the New York
Penal Law, to take a typical statutory scheme, one who intends to cause serious
physical injury to another person is guilty of either a misdemeanor, a class D
felony or a class B felony for identical blows leading respectively to physical
mjury, serious physical injury, or death.23
Similarly, a stolen suitcase may contain almost nothing or a great fortune.
Two different thieves, quite equal in depravity and dangerousness, who spirit
23 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.00, 120.05, 125.25 (McKinney 1987); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2(2), 211.1(1)-(2) (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04,
784.011, 784.021 (West 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1(b), 12-1, -2 (Smith-Hurd
1989); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02, 22.01(a)(1), (b), 22.02(a)(1), (b) (West 1989).
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away such luggage may be guilty of offenses whose maximum penalties vary
by a factor of 50.24
It follows directly from the subjective theories that attempts ought to be
punished just as severely as completed crimes. The more consistent exponents
of subjectivism have argued strenuously for this proposition.25 Despite the
Model Penal Code's campaign to this end, however, many states have been
reluctant to equate the penalty for the offense and its attempt.26 The Model
Penal Code itself recognizes that death or life imprisonment may be appropriate
for murder but not for attempted murder.27
Additionally, the prohibition against the prosecution's proving, at the
liability phase, the defendant's bad character through evidence of prior crimes28
is m some tension with subjective theories. If the point of criminal liability is as
a marker for present depravity or future dangerousness, it should certainly be
permissible to let evidence of character play a role m the jury's determination
of guilt for the particular offense. The inference from prior bad acts to the
probability of guilt could hardly be called "prejudicial," if the whole point
underlying the crimnal trial were to make a best judgment either of the
offender's depravity or his dangerousness.
In short, the criminal law as a matter of course focuses upon the particular
acts with which the offender is charged and is systematically sensitive to the
consequences of those acts. This is not to say that the offender's depravity is
never relevant to liability To wound someone with intent to wound is typically
2 4 Petit larceny, a class-A misdemeanor, carries a maximum penalty of six months for
a first offender m New York State. Grand larceny in the first degree, a class-B felony,
carries a maximum twenty-five year sentence for a first offender. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 70.00, 70.15, 155.25, 155.45 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992). See also ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1(e) (Smith-Hurd 1989).
25 See HART, supra note 7, at 129-31; Lawrence Becker, Cnnunal Attempt and the
7eory ofthe Law of Cnmes, 3 PiL. & PUB. AFF 262 (1974); see also GROSS, supra note
12, at 425. LaFave and Scott almost recogmze this corollary of their position that
dangerousness is the key to the law of attempts. ("Taking into account the rationale of
attempt, a person who attempts a crime should be amenable to the same puishment as a
person who completed the crime, subject to the qualification that extreme sanctions intended
only for general deterrence should not be permitted.") LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 4, at
510.
26 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04(4)
(West 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4(c) (Smith-Hurd 1989); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 110.05 (McKinney 1987); TEX. PENALCODE ANN. § 15.01(c) (West 1989).
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1985). For states that have followed the Model
Penal Code m treating the attempt in the same way as the crime attempted, except for
crimes pumshable by death or life imprisonment, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-51
(West 1985); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1989); and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 905 (1983).
28 See FED. R. EVID. 404; People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466 (N.Y. 1930).
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a higher level assault than is a reckless or negligent wounding. The gradations
of homicide show the highest development of this phenomenon. Perhaps even
dangerousness may be said to play a role, by indirection, in the main body of
criminal doctrine. My thesis is only that the extent to which the particular
offense is imposed upon society always and essentially plays a vital role.
This does not yet amount to a demonstration of my contention that an
imposition is necessary to the proper ascription of criminal liability. It is
enough at this descriptive stage of the argument to take note of the seriousness
of the conflict between the law's core approach to liability and the subjectivist
inspired criminalization of harmless attempts. The conceptual and moral depth
of the conflict should become clearer as this essay progresses. It should also
become clearer that the resolution of the conflict that is least disruptive of the
corpus and spirit of criminal law is also the resolution that is most appealing as
a matter of moral theory. It is to reject altogether the modem subjective
theories.
B. The Incompleteness of Subjective Theories
As just discussed, one of the conflicts between subjective theories of
criminal liability and the existing body of criminal law is in the grading of
offenses. Existing law generally follows the principle that one act constitutes a
more serious offense than another if the first caused substantially more harm
than the second, even if both were done with the same mental culpability. This
principle is inconsistent with subjectivism. In certain instances the failure of the
subjective theories to conform to the existing law takes the form of a more
serious pathology. In these instances, the subjective theories exhibit a radical
incompleteness.
The incompleteness shows up in cases when the criminal law has several
grades of seriousness based on harm and when there is nothing subjective to
distinguish among them. Consider the attempt to pick an empty pocket. On the
imposition theory, this behavior may be deemed a criminal trespass, as we all
have a legitimate right to the privacy of our pockets. There is, however, no
liability for attempted larceny here on the imposition theory because there is no
objective risk that anything will be stolen from an empty pocket.
Partisans of subjective theories, of course, insist that this is irrational and
that what we would in ordinary language call an attempt to pick a pocket
should be recognized as an attempted theft by the criminal law. But what is it
the attempted theft of? New York, to use this state as an example again, has
five grades of larceny depending upon the amount stolen.29 Suppose that a
pickpocket is arrested after having put his hand into the empty pocket of a
diamond district courier. Was this larceny in the Fifth Degree for an attempt to
29 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.25-155.42 (McKinney 1987).
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steal something, or was it Grand Larceny in the First Degree for an attempt to
steal property of value more than one million dollars?
If the offender is so cooperative as to answer our questions, he is most
likely to say that his intent was to steal whatever happened to be in the pocket.
He knew that such pockets are sometimes empty and sometimes contain
gemstones with aggregate value of a million dollars or more, and frequently
contain cash or gemstones of lesser value. There is nothing in his intent that
ties the act uniquely to any particular offense.
30
This circumstance is not specific to theft offenses or even to what is
ordinarily thought of as offense grading. Suppose that the offender is annoyed
by the loud music and party sounds coming from the windows of her next door
neighbor. In fact what she is hearing is a recording of an earlier party. No one
is home. When the offender throws a hand grenade through the window, she is
unquestionably guilty of some serious property offenses, but what about
attempts from the assault and homicide families? On the imposition theory, of
course, there was never any risk of death or injury to anyone. So there was no
attempted homicide or assault. The subjectivist, by contrast, is confident that
throwing a grenade through the open window into what sounded like a
crowded party is attempted murder.
But how many counts of attempted murder? This is more than an academic
question as the number of years the offender will spend in prison will depend
directly upon the answer. The offender is likely to insist that her intent was just
to shake the partygoers up, but we may well conclude that her real intent was
to kill "some" of the partygoers and to injure "others." Alternatively we might
say that she behaved with depraved indifference towards the lives of all the
partygoers. The imposition theorist would have no objection to this last
formulation so long as "all the partygoers" is understood to mean all the actual
partygoers, zero in number.
For the subjectivist, however, the number of counts of attempted murder or
attempted assault depends not upon the objective facts but upon the facts as the
offender believed them to be. But of course the offender need have no very
specific belief as to how many partygoers were in the room into which she
threw the grenade. Perhaps, if she were very cooperative, we could pin her
down that she thought that there were at least six and no more than 35-
although even this range is more likely a report of an estimate made upon
reflection during the interrogation rather than a report of what was in her mind
30 Of course, sometimes the would-be thief may have a belief that the pocket contains
a particular thing. I am not arguing that the subjective theory is always indeterminate, but
that it will be radically indeterminate in some cases.
It is a symptom of the extent of capitulation to subjectivism of Fletcher, Gross, and
Hogan that their theories, in finding an attempted larceny in the empty pocket cases, share




when she threw the grenade. Under these and similar circumstances, the
subjective theory simply lacks the resources to specify the number of counts.
One way around this incompleteness, born of the fact that the subjective
theory is incongruent with the imposition based structure of the criminal law, is
to adopt a lowest denominator default position. In empty pocket theft cases, the
attempt, under this approach, would be taken to be of the lowest degree of
theft. In cases like the phantom party, the offender would be liable for one
count of attempted murder. This puts a patch over the hole m the theory, but it
is, of course, a very ad hoc patch, running utterly at cross purposes to the
theory itself. The subjectivist would surely balk at charging an attempted theft
from an empty bank vault as a low level misdemeanor or violation. But short of
admitting that the theory is hopelessly incomplete because it tries to do without
imposition, this is the best the subjectivist can do.
C. The Conflict Between Subjective Theones and Cnminal Responsibility
A defendant has committed a murder only if the victim died and only if the
defendant's actions causally contributed to that death. If the latter condition
fails, the defendant is not responsible for the death. If the former, then there is
nothing for which the offender could be responsible.
It is no accident or mere linguistic convention that there should be this
connection between criminal liability and responsibility The sanctions of the
crimnal law are among the most serious interferences that a state makes m the
lives of individuals. Unchecked, these sanctions would be the stuff of social
terrorism of the most threatening sort. Criminal law's chief internal protection
against such excesses is the requirement that there be no criminal liability
without criminal responsibility The requirement of responsibility is what
separates criminal justice from other forms of social protection.
So the offender must be responsible for something. I do not yet say that the
offender must be responsible for an imposition. That is a perfectly natural step,
but to take it directly would be to reach my conclusion a bit too quickly As
already suggested, the great majority of criminal statutes do require that the
offender be responsible for an imposition. For the sake of argument, however,
let us give the received view some space to work with by entertaining the
possibility that criminal liability may be predicated on responsibility for certain
states of affairs that do not rise to the level of impositions.
Consider three cases in turn. In the first, the defendant, with intent to kill,
fires a bullet that strikes the victim m the head killing her. In the second, with
the same intent, the defendant fires a bullet that just misses the victim's head.
In the third the defendant, again with the same intent, fires a pistol that is,
unknown to him, a harmless stage prop.
In the first case, the defendant is unequivocally responsible for the death.
In the second, it is not difficult to find something for which the defendant is
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responsible. Even m the absence of causing fright or the like, the defendant is
responsible for the substantial risk to the victim's life that existed as the bullet
sped through the air.
In the case of the stage pistol, one's first reaction ought, I think, to be that
there is nothing here for which the defendant could be responsible. In the spirit
of continuing generosity to the subjective theory, however, let us consider the
hypothesis that the defendant is responsible for "shooting at someone with the
intent to cause death and with the belief that there is a significant probability of
causing death."
Does it properly describe the situation to say that we hold the defendant
liable because he is responsible for this state of affairs? Such a description
would be proper only if there is m this situation something that society takes to
be an evil sufficiently great to sanction and if the offender is responsible for
that evil. I will contend that, although there is something in this situation that
society takes seriously and although there is something for which the defendant
is responsible, the two are not the same.
In what does the seriousness of the situation consist? There would seem to
be three possibilities: the defendant's evil character as evidenced by the act, the
risk induced by the act, and the alarm actually caused by the act.
The last of these elements, of course, is perfectly at home m the imposition
theory If the victim was put in fear by the episode, then there was an
imposition. Such lesser offenses as harassment or menacing are chargeable
based on this imposition. This component of what the defendant did, however,
clearly could not support a charge of attempted murder, as the subjective view
would have it.
By contrast, the evil character evidenced is very different from an
imposition. If we find m it the predicate for liability, then the imposition theory
must be m error. Imposition would not be a necessary condition of liability
It would be hard to deny that there is something that society regards as
serious about so evil a state of mind. An evil state of mind is not, however,
something that one can be said to be responsible for, in the sense of criminal
responsibility Under normal circumstances, we are not even causally
responsible for our own desires or intents. We simply have this or that desire
or intent.31
31 There are exceptional situations in which it would be fairly natural to say that one
caused one's own desire. For example, if a prize were being offered for the person who
could drink the most of a promoted soft drink, one might go for a long run in order to work
up a good thirst. A contestant who employed this tactic has caused her desire for a drink. In
a more important but far more tenuous way one's character is in some respects self-created.
Our aspirations to be of a certain character have a long term, if less than determinative,
influence on the sorts of people we are. As important as this may be for understanding and
evaluating character, it is clearly a world apart from the tight and immediate causal relation
that we demand for criminal responsibility.
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More generally, when we are focusing upon the defendant's state of mind
we are not really making use of the concept of moral responsibility at all.
Moral assessment of character is a different and quite independent enterprise.
Thus, insofar as the seriousness of the shooting with a stage prop is a matter of
evidence of bad character, it falls outside the category of criminal
responsibility
The defender of the received view might insist that I am under-describing
what happened when the defendant fired the prop pistol. There is a substantial
risk to society m shootings with pistols reasonably believed to be real and
operable. As Fletcher would have it, the act under consideration "conform[s] to
a dangerous-act type." 32 The defendant is thus responsible for intentionally
bringing about this sort of risk.
It must be granted that a statistical risk would become evident if we
surveyed the results of "shooting at someone from such and such distance with
intent to kill and the belief that the pistol is real and operable." The survey will
surely turn up an impressive number of fatalities. They will occur m those
cases in which the shooter's belief m the operability of the pistol was correct.
These are all fatalities, however, for which other persons are entirely
responsible. The stage prop shooter does not share m that criminal
responsibility
Indeed, a moment's reflection should show that such a survey could have
no bearing whatsoever on criminal liability for the stage pistol episode.
Consider a defendant who was making the first use of an entirely new sort of
deadly weapon. There is no past history of deaths or injuries resulting from the
use of this weapon. If it turns out to have been unloaded, anyone with the
slightest subjectivist leanings will argue for liability Other killings for which
the defendant might be said to be responsible cannot, therefore, be what is
behind the subjectivist's intuitions.
It might be responded that I am still not being sufficiently general in
abstracting from the particular situation. The subjectivist may insist that the
new weapon user can be held responsible for past crimes with weapons of
similar dangerousness. They need not be cases involving the same weapon.
Consider, then, what to say about a defendant who unknowingly used a
stage prop pistol in a society that had been utterly peaceable for the last two
hundred years. Now there is no past history of fatalities for which the
defendant might be said to be responsible by statistical proxy Still, if there is
strong evidence of his intent to kill, say a confession, anyone but an imposition
theorist is going to want to hold this defendant criminally liable. If he is held
liable, it cannot be because he is criminally responsible for something. It can
only be because he has revealed himself to be of bad character and potentially
dangerous.
3 2 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 65.
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What follows from all this is that there is no account of such impossible
attempts-as shooting with a stage pistol-on which what society finds worthy
of condemning in them is comprehended under the concept of criminal
responsibility Indeed, a close look reveals that what tempts us to impose
liability for such attempts comes down in the end to the wicked character of the
defendant or to his future dangerousness. Now perhaps there is a comer of the
criminal law m which criminal responsibility is unnecessary for criminal
liability and m which bad character or dangerousness is sufficient to send to jail
those who have done no harm. The concept of criminal responsibility,
however, plays a crucial role in protecting us from overreaching m the name of
public safety For this reason, we should be cautious m accepting the
proposition that there may be criminal liability without criminal responsibility
We should avoid this conclusion unless the moral force of arguments
supporting it is overwhelming. In fact, the opposite turns out to be true.
D The Conflict Between Subjective Theones and the Meaning of
"Attempt"
The way ordinary speakers use a term will not necessarily control the
contours of the legal concept answering to that term, but if the term is used in a
statute, particularly a criminal statute, adopting a broader interpretation of the
term requires a good reason. To criminalize an act as an "attempt," it prima
facie ought to be an "attempt" in ordinary parlance. I follow Fletcher on this
point 33 and in his conclusion that in many cases where subjectivist theory finds
attempts, there is nothing that the ordinary speaker would so regard.34 The
instance that Fletcher discusses is one of mstaken belief. In addition,
subjectivist attempts may fall short of being ordinary language attempts because
their position is too early on the preparation-act spectrum.
1. Mistaken Belief Cases
An actor who does X under the mistaken belief that X is P is only said to
be attempting to "do P" if she would desist in her attempt if she found that X
was not in fact P For example, a buyer of low priced cloth in the mistaken
belief it is stolen would not have declined to buy the cloth if he found it had not
been stolen.35 One who has intercourse with a woman he believes underage
would rarely have avoided the encounter if he knew her to be of age.36 One
who sought to get messages out of prison in the false belief that the warden did
33 FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 160.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 162; see People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906).
36 Id. (Jaffe hypothetical).
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not know of or permit their sending, would continue to send the messages if
informed that the warden did know 37
Fletcher calls this counterfactual conditional test the "rational motivation"
test.38 With a minor caveat it does appear to be both a necessary condition of
an ordinary language attempt, and a test that judges traditionally found
compelling in applying the legal concept. 39 As those judges implicitly held, it
would be improper to hold one liable for an attempt who was not aimig at
what was forbidden by law 40
2. Pre-final Act Cases
Turning to the line between preparation and attempt, I will argue that an
actor engaging in the later, but not last, steps of his criminal plan has not yet
made an ordinary language "attempt" despite the fact that the subjective theory
would find hun liable.
Consider, first, the following change of mind case. An actor has done
everything necessary to bomb a building short of activating the bomb's trigger.
He is in the elevator of the building with his bomb when he decides to forget
the whole thing, and go home. When he gets home he is asked, "Did you blow
up the Exchange?" Actor: "No." "Did you even try'" "No, I had the bomb
with me on the elevator, but then I changed my mind." "Try" here is doing the
same duty as "attempt." The actor had not yet attempted to bomb the
building.4 '
37 Id., see United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973).
38 Id. at 161.
39 The counterfactual test might sometimes be satisfied for the "wrong" reasons.
Suppose that Jaffe would, upon learning that the cloth was not stolen, start to ruminate on
the fact that he did typically buy stolen goods. He nught then come to question his whole
mode of doing business, and decide to give it up and become a social worker. He therefore
would decline to buy the cloth. Even if we believed this would be the outcome of the
counterfactual test for a given individual, we would still not think that he attempted to buy
stolen cloth. The fine tuimng that would be required to correct Fletcher's test in this respect
is not worth our time here.
40 United States v. Bemgan, 482 F.2d 171 (1973); People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y.
1906).
41 But could the bomber not have responded, "I tned, but I could not bring myself to
go through with it?" Tis would, I think, be a proper thing to say if the would-be bomber
had a struggle with his conscience before aborting his plan. If he simply had second
thoughts, it would be improper. But even when proper, what the bomber is really saying is
that he tried to overcome his conscience, not that he tried to bomb the building m the most
central usage of that term. One might mark the difference by placing special emphasis on
the "tried." He is indicating that he made conscientious efforts towards the completion of
the plan, perhaps to mute the implied criticism of a coconspirator. He is not saying that he
got so far as to actually make the attempt.
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To describe the changed mind cases as non-attempts is clearly the correct
ordinary language description. Ordinary language, however, is not so congenial
to the imposition theory for failures caused by circumstances other than a
change of mind. Suppose that the police have been tipped off to the possibility
of a bombing and have sealed off the building. Then the conversation imght
have gone as follows. "Did you bomb the Exchange?" "No." "Did you even
try9 " "Yes, but I couldn't get into the lobby The cops were guarding the
door." Here the actor actually did less than on the previous case. Yet this case
is an ordinary language attempt, and the former was not.
Similarly, all failures on which the actor had completed his side of the
action count as ordinary language attempts, even if "impossible" (so long as
they pass the rational motivation test). Those who mistakenly shoot into empty
beds or at stumps are trying to kill, as is the poisoner who unwittingly uses
sugar. The believer in voodoo is attempting to kill his victim when he sticks
pins into a doll.
In at least some of these respects, then, ordinary language uses "attempt"
too broadly for the purposes of the criminal law, even on existing versions of
subjective theory (It is universally conceded that the voodoo case ought not
give rise to liability ) In general, failures caused by circumstances beyond the
actor's control count in ordinary language as "attempts" even in those cases
where no one would propose attaching criminal liability, either because the
"attempt" was too early truncated or because it was too impossible.
To find that ordinary language is more prodigal in its identification of
attempts than is the criminal law should hardly be surprising. Criminal liability,
being as serious a matter as it is, must, on any account, be parceled out
sparingly It would be a good deal more surprising, and troubling, however, if
the criminal law were to count something as an attempt that would not be so
called by ordinary speakers of English.
Consider the actor in the first example as he walks onto the elevator with
his bomb. He is still following the steps of his original plan, but he has not yet
arrived at the point of final decision whether to trigger the bomb. If the police
apprehend him at that point, then he had attempted to blow up the Exchange
under the usage just discussed. But how is ordinary language to be deployed
the moment before he is arrested? At that moment had he "attempted" to blow
up the Exchange? Suppose that a confederate reaches him by radio. "Have you
blown up the Exchange?" "No." "Have you made the attempt?" "Not yet. I'm
just about to get into the elevator."
So a police arrest of a suspect who is in the course of carrying out a
criminal plan but who has not yet taken the last necessary step is an arrest of
someone who has not yet made an attempt according to ordinary language. An
arrest obviously cannot itself convert a non-attempt into an attempt for
purposes of the criminal law Therefore, the ordinary language usage on which
it counts as an attempt once the arrest thwarts the plan may safely be ignored,
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as well as such usage in cases where the arrest was made after something else
thwarted the plan.
The relevant part of ordinary language, then, finds no attempt in an
ongoing plan short of the final necessary act, just as it found no attempt to do P
on a nstaken belief, if it would not have affected the actor's intentions had he
found out that what he intended was not P
3. The Consequences of Ordinary Language
It is time to consider in a little more detail what, if anything, is the
significance for criminal liability about the way English is ordinarily spoken
given these facts. It could be objected with some plausibility that this conflict
between subjective theories of attempts and ordinary language is of little
moment. The issue is one of policy, not language. It is to be expected that short
English expressions may not correspond exactly to the contours of liability as
set out by balancing diverse considerations of policy
When the question is what crime ought be charged for particular behavior,
however, ordinary language may have more weight than this objection
suggests. If conduct that does not remotely resemble racketeering is swept by
definition within the scope of a statute labeled "Racketeering Activity," there
may well be a tendency to think of the conduct as more serious than it really is.
This tendency may show up in either improperly high statutory penalties or in
improperly severe judicial sentencing.
Attempted murder is properly a serious crime because of what attempts
are. To sweep behavior within this category, if ordinary speakers would not
regard it as an attempt, may well improperly inflate the criminal seriousness of
the behavior.
More immediately, any theory that makes a criminal attempt of conduct
that ordinary language would not regard as an attempt raises serious questions
of statutory construction and fair notice. Criminal attempts are a special kind of
attempt, but they must at least be attempts-unless the statute instead makes it
clear just what they are.
E. The Conflict Between Subjective Theones and Autonomy
1. The Pnonty of Liberty
Consider the textbook noncriminal wicked person. He is driven by
monstrous criminal desires. He spends his time plotting in great detail the most
horrible acts. As luck would have it, however, circumstances always intervene
to prevent him from taking even the first step of his then intended criminal
campaign. He is not punishable because he has not in fact ever made the
decision to carry his plan into action.
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This particular wicked person is generally considered beyond the reach of
the criminal law The question is, why is he beyond it? On the pure subjective
theory he is pumshable, m principle. There are, however, contingencies in the
real world that prevent our being sufficiently confident that any particular
suspect is such a person. Without the decision to carry out even a preliminary
act, the reasoning goes, we cannot have sufficiently good evidence that this
individual is anything worse than a dreamer of evil dreams. We cannot be sure
that he would make the decision actually to commit the crime. We do not, then,
know that he is dangerous or wicked.
A different variant of subjective theory is based upon philosophical
behaviorism. It contends that intents do not really exist until they are
manifested in action. That is to say that there is no fact of the matter whether
the person with wicked thought content really is wicked or dangerous until he
acts.
On the imposition theory, the reason we cannot punish the pre-act wicked
or dangerous person is because he has not imposed. It is not important whether
there is a fact of the matter as to his intentions or whether we can be certain
that he will make the decision to act. We can afford to be agnostic as to
philosophical behaviorism and as to the potential sufficiency of evidence of
depravity and dangerousness in the absence of acts. The point is that so long as
one has not yet made the crucial criminal decision, he ought always be given
the chance that he will decide against committing the offense. To make criminal
liability hinge upon physical acts respects human freedom. No matter how
wicked his mind, our subjective moral monster may always make the right
decision at the last moment. However improbable this possibility, it ought to be
respected.
What I want now to examine is the way subjective theories and the
imposition theory stack up when measured against the desideratum of providing
the maximum proper scope for individual liberty On the imposition theory
criminal liability rarely attaches until after the last act that the actor needs to do
to bring about the state of affairs she intends. (Indeed criminal liability may not
attach even then, but this point may be postponed for now.) On the pure
subjective theory, liability may attach at any point. In principle, if not in
practice, that can be before the actor moves a muscle.42
This difference in the scope of liberty left outside the purview of the
criminal sanction as between the imposition theory and the pure form of the
subjective theory is not only significant, it is surely decisive. It would not be
42 For the philosophical behaviorist variant of the subjective theory, it cannot m
principle occur before the actor does something observable. There must be an act sufficient
to disambiguate the intention as one of the criminal variety. In this respect, this variant of
the subjective theory is slightly less radical than the pure "evidentiary" theory. It goes a
small step along the road towards the imposition theory, and is for that reason immune from
the first stage of the argument here.
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morally acceptable to employ the criminal sanction against one who had done
nothing, however wicked or dangerous she rmght be. That would insufficiently
respect the punished person's autonomy That is, it would conflict with the
principle that each person must be regarded m morality as the author of her
own choices. It is wrong for an outside agency to impute those choices to the
person.
As Fletcher argues, subjectivism tends to:
ignore an essential postulate m the relationship of the state to the individual m
liberal society. Thoughts, intentions and feelings occur m the pnvate sphere.
The state needs some ground, some warrant, for probing into ths realm of
citizens' autonomy. Tins warrant obtains if the issue is that of assessing
responsibility for having caused harm to others or, at the very nmmuum, for
having subjected others to danger.43
But, of course, opponents of the imposition theory feel no distress in the
conclusion that the pure form of the subjective theory is unacceptable for
reasons of liberty or autonomy As already conceded, no one consciously holds
the pure form of the theory Popular, instead, are subjective theories on which
personal dangerousness or wickedness are manifested m concrete acts. All such
theories can make some argument that the autonomy of the actor has been
respected. One or more of his own acts are essential predicates of criminal
liability
The availability of these manifested depravity/dangerousness theories is
thought to enable their holders to avoid problems of autonomy and liberty
without going so far as the imposition theory The dangerousness theory, m
particular, permits arrest and conviction of the manifestly dangerous before that
dangerousness has come to fruition as harm or concrete danger44-that is,
before the imposition theory would ascribe liability
2. The Line Between Preparation and Attempt
The "retreat" from the pure version of the subjective theory raises two
questions. First, just how available are these purported mddle positions
between the pure subjective theory and the imposition theory9 Second, do they
give the actor a morally satisfactory measure of liberty9
What intermediate positions are there? On the spectrum extending from
intent without act at one extreme to imposition at the other, the following
43 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 65.
44 For the pure version of the depravity branch of the "manifested" subjective theory,
cutting off future danger is only a fortunate consequence, not a justification of liability. The
point for this version of the theory is that it is cnminal depravity itself that is the root of
liability. Once such depravity has been made manifest nothing further is required.
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points suggest themselves. Liability might first attach at the intending
offender's first step, first (cumulatively) substantial step, first unequivocal step,
first step at which apparent dangerousness licenses police intervention, first
step at which there is proximate danger, or the last step. I will consider each of
these possibilities in turn, and argue that each but the "last step" provides too
narrow a scope for liberty In addition, I will argue that none of the apparently
intermediate positions is truly intermediate in that none has a justification that
would not, if it worked, also justify the pure version of subjectivism.
a. The First Step
This conceivable, if unlikely, version of the subjective theory of criminal
liability imposes only the requirement that the actor must at least have
performed one voluntary act in furtherance of her criminal plan. This
requirement appears to quiet the first and most compelling objection from
autonomy to a subjective theory That it is something of an ad hoc addition to
the theory is not a serious criticism. There is nothing wrong in shaping a
theory in terms of two quite different concerns, here dangerousness or
wickedness on the one hand and autonomy on the other.
This particular marriage of subjective theory to autonomy concerns,
however, is of the shotgun variety Presumably the concern to take autonomy
and liberty into account is a concern that criminal liability step back and give
the actor significant moral space within which to make her own decisions. It
hardly seems compatible with this motivation to permit criminal liability to
attach the instant that there is a token physical act.
The first act may be quite innocent in appearance. The would-be murderer
plans to go downtown to purchase a pistol. To that end she walks out the front
door. Nothing in this act itself gives any evidence that the actor is dangerous. It
therefore fails to provide any practical link between the theory and the
adjudication of guilt.
After forming the murder plan and walking out the front door on the way
to purchase a pistol, the actor might well reconsider while walking across the
lawn towards her car. Perhaps, she thinks to herself, "it would be better to
snub the victim rather than to snuff him." Determining to follow this new
course of action, the actor puts her car keys in her pocket, picks up the
newspaper and returns inside.
Suppose now, stricken by feelings of guilt, she turns herself in at the local
precinct house, and gives a persuasive video taped statement in which she
confesses to the above events. Her statement establishes that with intent to kill
another human being, she voluntarily took a step in furtherance of that intent.
Even putting aside any evidentiary rule excluding uncorroborated
confessions, this case surely ought not to be prosecuted. The reason to decline
prosecution is not that the case is too weak in any evidentiary way What the
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actor did simply ought not to be criminal. Liberty requires a greater scope. It is
still well within the mtmmum that must be accorded to autonomy to give the
actor credit for changing her mind.
Credit for actually changing one's mind is available under abandonment
statutes. These limitations on the law of attempt permit the agent to absolve
himself of criminal liability for an ongoing but uncompleted criminal plan,
usually by taking affirmative steps to derail the plan. 45 Such statutes protect
part of the autonomy interest discussed here. It would not, however, be
sufficient to engraft the abandonment limitation onto the first act theory Had
the actor written out a statement of her plan in advance, and had she been
intercepted by the police as she walked towards her car, having not (yet)
changed her mind, she still ought not be held criminally liable. She had not
abandoned her crminal plan, but there remained so many opportunities for her
to abandon it, that it would be far too stingy to autonomy concerns to hold her
liable.
In short, the first step variant makes such a weak concession to autonomy
as to be morally as unacceptable as the pure subjective theory It does not,
then, represent a viable intermediate position.
b. A Substantial Step
According to the Model Penal Code it is a criminal attempt if with
appropriate culpability the actor "purposely does anything which, under
the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act constituting a
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission
of the crime." 46
The problem with the "substantial step" test is illustrated by an actor who
forms his evil plan while in the middle of the Olympic Mountains. He plans to
murder a friend who is camping back at the trailhead where the actor left his
car. Getting to the car requires three days of strenuous climbing, scrambling,
and hiking. It is far and away the most time and energy that will be spent in the
overall plan to get a pistol from the glove compartment of his car and empty it
into his friend's head.
This actor ought not, however, be liable for an attempt when he reaches his
car. The plan has almost been completed in terms of such quantitative measures
as time and energy spent, but the would-be murderer has not yet faced the
crucial points of decision that will test his resolve: getting hold of the pistol,
45 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1985) ("abandoned his effort or
otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and
voluntary renunciation of his crimnal purpose").
46 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1985); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-
4(a) (Smith-Hurd 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-49(a) (West 1985); COLO. REV
STAT. § 18-2-101(1) (1986).
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loading it, confronting his victim, and pulling the trigger. Again respect for his
autonomy requires giving him at least some of these chances to change his
mind, despite the fact that what he has already done to carry out the plan is
unquestionably substantial.
This intermediate position, then, still does not give autonomy enough scope
to constitute a meaningful compromise between the pure subjective and pure
imposition theories.
c. An Unequivocal Step
It may be objected that "substantial step" should properly be understood
not in terms of the quantity of effort or the percentage of the overall criminal
plan accomplished, but in terms of the clarity of the step's referability to a
criminal plan. It should be an act that would never or rarely be done except as
part of such plan-"an act which shows criminal intent on the face of it."47
The drafters of the Model Penal Code understood a substantial step in this
general way They required that a substantial step be "strongly corroborative of
the actor's criminal purpose." 48 Perhaps this strong corroboration is intended
to be somewhat less demanding than unequivocal criminality, but it is a close
relative. In any event, it represents a significant addition to the notion of a
substantial step as perceived by the actor.
Locating the crucial liability line at this point is a popular way of seeking
to give the subjective theory something of an objective character. It is
indicative of the subjectivist hegemony that such leading anti-subjectivists as
Fletcher and the Fifth Circuit panel that decided United States v. Oviedo49 have
also settled on versions of this unequivocality test.50
By contrast, the most outspokenly subjectivist commentators, such as
Glanville Williams, have attacked the unequivocality test as unworkable.
Williams argues that we lack the conceptual resources to draw the line between
unequivocal and equivocal.5 1 Without making a judgment as to whether this
line-drawing difficulty is really fatal to the unequivocality test, I want to raise a
more serious problem. That is that the test gives us the wrong results, even in
clear cases.
The test does, of course, sometimes give intuitive results. To return to the
mountains, it is unquestionable that the hike out of the Olympics fails the
unequivocality test. The hike out is not corroborative, at least not to the outside
47 The King v. Barker, 1924 N.Z.L.R. 865 (1924).48 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Pt. I, at 329-31 (1985).
49 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976).
50 Id. at 885 ("Objective acts performed [must] mark the defendant's conduct as
crminal m nature."); Fletcher, supra note 12, at 64.




world. It bears no stamp of criminality Nearly everyone who hikes into the
mountains eventually hikes out again. There would be no liability on the
unequivocality test, and that seems altogether proper.
The problem arises in the following sort of case. A man buys a rifle with
telescopic sight from an illegal street vendor saying, "I am buying this gun to
shoot my wife." His purchase is unequivocally referable to his plan to kill his
wife. It probably opens him up to liability on a weapons charge, but not yet to
attempted murder. Attempted murder ought not be charged even if he rented a
room opposite his wife's place of business, repeating to the landlord that he
was renting the room to kill his wife. If the next day he removes the telescopic
sight from the rifle and brings it to the rented room to check out his shooting
angles, he will have compounded his unequivocal steps.
These actions taken together lack any semblance of innocent explanation.
Still, few prosecutors would charge attempted murder. This prosecutorial
reluctance would be fully justified. Most prosecutors would probably point to
the fact that the rifle itself was not yet present at the intended assassination
location. Therefore there was not yet an immediately dangerous situation.52 In
autonomy terms, crucial choices still lay some distance in the future. This
intermediate point is, then, not yet one that allows sufficient scope to autonomy
to counter the fatal defects of the pure subjective theory Inasmuch as the
philosophical behaviorist version of the subjective theory entails some form of
the unequivocality thesis, that position is untenable for these same reasons.
d. The Step Licensing Police Intervention
Suppose that a county council member of Cypress County has promised to
"shoot between the eyes" any federal official responsible for raising his taxes.
The President, having just signed a measure lowering exemptions to the federal
income tax, is scheduled to make a speech at Cypress City The council
member is spotted in the crowd, carrying a pistol, for which he has a valid
carry permit. The Secret Service may certainly detain the council member for
the duration of the President's stay in Cypress. Just as certainly neither federal
nor state prosecutors can charge him with attempted assassination, attempted
murder or attempted assault.
The law of criunal procedure is crystal clear that the police may intervene
on reasonable suspicion.53 One cannot be found criminally liable, however,
52 See GROSS, supra note 12, at 195.
53 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). What is somewhat less clear are the outer
limits of what the police can do on reasonable suspicion that a crime is soon to be
committed. Brief detentions, pat downs for weapons, and confiscation of contraband found
upon such pat downs are straightforward. Excluding the suspect from any place he would
otherwise have a right to be is more troubling, but is presumably permissible if the
exclusion is carefully calibrated against the apparent immediate danger.
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without proof beyond a reasonable doubt,54 or even arrested without probable
cause.55 This is from a moral point of view unexceptionable. The protection of
the public from immediate danger ought to have a considerably lower trigger
point than does criminal liability Otherwise the system would either be under-
protective or over-crimnalizing. The interference with the agent's autonomy m
turning him away from an intended crime is substantially less than m
convicting him for that crime.
Recall that my current argument has a double purpose. First, it is intended
to show that the imposition theory is more respectful of autonomy and liberty
concerns than are its rivals. Second, by runmng through the stages at which
liability for attempts might be thought to arise, I seek to show that there really
is no viable position intermediate between the unposition theory and the pure
subjective theory
Turning to the second purpose, the discussion in this subsection purports to
show that there is no point in opting for a theory on which criminal liability
attaches at that step of the criminal enterprise at which the police may
reasonably intervene. The intervention is possible and proper before liability
attaches. Indeed, the realm of permissible police intervention must be greater
than that of crimnal liability, as a matter of constitutional logic.
With respect to my first purpose, however, it might be concluded that in
conceding a right of the police to intervene at a stage prior to attachment of
criminal liability, I have given away the point. If the scope of liberty is already
curtailed by the authority of the police to act on reasonable suspicion, why be
concerned where the line of criminal liability is? I concede that the possibility
of police intervention preliability diminishes the difference in practice between
a properly functiomng Imposition regime and a subjective regime.
It diminishes that difference, however, only slightly To curtail liberty
through the threat of criminal liability is inevitably more of a curtailment than
results from police interference pursuant to their protective function. It is more
restrictive first because criminal sanctions are substantially more serious
infringements on liberty than are police protective practices, as the case of the
Cypress councilman shows. Second, crimalization is more restrictive because
of the phenomenon of over-deterrence. People may forego innocent actions if
those actions might wrongly appear to be steps in a crimnal enterprise
sufficient for liability
In short, criminal liability cannot constitutionally be attached at the earliest
point at which police intervention is licensed, and there is no compelling reason
to attach it as soon as constitutionally permissible. Immediate protective needs
can be handled by intervention without liability There is then no motivation
54 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
55 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
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for this intermediate position between the pure subjective and pure imposition
theories. Autonomy again urges us on in the direction of the imposition theory
e. The Step Introducing Proximate Danger
This is the step that brings danger no more than moments away If it
simultaneously brings objective risk, then criminal liability will attach on the
imposition theory as well as on any more subjective theory Consider again the
plan to bomb a building. Suppose first that the bomb is somewhat unstable.
The bomber intends to place this bomb on the fourteenth floor. She is arrested
with the bomb m the lobby Because her actions had already inposed an
objective risk of the bomb's explosion in the building, it is perfectly
appropriate to charge her with a serious criminal offense. That the imposition
theory would not necessarily denominate that offense an "attempt," is a
relatively mmor matter.
There is, however, a major parting of the ways if the dangerousness of the
situation depends entirely upon a voluntary act of the intending offender.
Suppose that the bomb is quite stable, and that it cannot detonate, practically
speaking, unless the bomber goes through a fairly complex set of actions that
only she understands. There is a danger here, but the only very significant
danger is that the bomber will decide to complete her plan. Few prosecutors
would be hesitant to charge attempt on these facts, but this time I contend that
they would be wrong.
I do not deny that the police could and should intervene to confiscate the
bomb. I do not even object to charging a lesser offense of weapon possession,
although this introduces some complexities. 56 What I would argue against is
attempt liability based on a risk of harm that is very unlikely to eventuate
unless the actor makes a decision that she has not yet made. This is not an
"objective risk" as I would use that phrase because it includes the subjective
element of choice by the very agent who is the putative target of attempt
56 Weapon possession offenses are partially inchoate m character. Insofar as the
purpose of a possession statute is to address the risk that the possessor will intentionally use
the weapon and thereby bring about a concrete evil, it is functionally similar, from the
imposition theory's standpoint, to an attempt statute that predicates liability at too early a
point. Insofar as the purpose of the statute is a concern for the general risk involved in
having such a weapon around, independent of intentional use by the possessor (accidental
firing, falling into the hands of children), it is supportable on the imposition theory. In
addition, the severity of possession offenses may sometimes be a function of a legislative
desire, unprincipled on any theory, to make a igh penalty available when the prosecution
cannot prove the substantive offense (murder, robbery, assault) that it is confident the
offender committed. So on the imposition theory the acceptability of a possession statute
will turn on its specific contours, and on the severity of its penalty. The details of this would
require a lengthy separate discussion.
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liability (It would count as an objective risk if whether harm would eventuate
depended solely upon the actions of potential victims, for example m walking
close to the bomb.)
The risk that depends essentially on the actor's choice to pull the trigger is
different from the risk posed by the same bomber who has not yet assembled
her bomb (but is certain to do so). It is different with respect to the immediacy
of the threat. The supporter of making this the threshold of liability might
contend that it represents a genuinely intermediate position between a pure
subjective theory and the imposition theory It denies liability for those certain
to commit crimes if the harm, or the last act that would lead to harm, is still
some distance in the future. In this way it creates room for a change of heart
during the intervening period, as the imposition theory contends for. If there is
an immediate risk that the offender will pull the trigger, however, the position
sides with the subjective theory, not requiring that the trigger actually be pulled
before liability attaches.
Is it correct that this proximate danger position represents an acceptable
compromise between imposition and subjective theories by ceding to the
imposition theory exactly as much as sanely can be ceded? The issue between
the proximate danger position and the imposition theory, again, is not whether
the police should intervene. Of course they should. The issue is what the
intending bomber is to be charged with once it is determined that her bomb
posed very little danger unless she went through a series of intentional steps.
The proximate danger position contends that she ought be charged with the
attempted bombing (presumably an attempted murder); the imposition theory
contends for a lesser possession charge.57
The issue separating the two positions is the propriety of treating with
equal seriousness the bomber who does trigger the device and the bomber who
does not, assuming that in the first case intervening circumstances prevent an
explosion (perhaps an undetectable flaw in the bomb's construction). Why
should the criminal law ignore the stunning difference in culpability between
the two?
There appear to be three ways that the proximate danger advocate could
respond to this challenge. Two are from the perspective of the dangerousness
version of subjectivism and one from that of the depravity version.
5 7 The possession charged would, m turn, have to be based on that lower level risk that
the bomb posed if not triggered by the actor. In the conceptually pure, if practically
inpossible case, m which it posed no risk at all except through the actor's intentional





First, a dangerousness theorist could argue that the decision to detonate is
irrelevant because the situation, predecision, is already sufficiently dangerous
to merit the more severe punishment. Under our hypothesis, however (stable
bomb with complex trigger), there is almost no danger in the situation outside
the risk that the fateful decision will be made. Abstracting from the risk of a
decision to detonate, the bomb poses no greater risk than similar items m a
military arsenal. If there is a very low probability of the decision being made,
then the total danger is modest. So a danger great enough to predicate an
attempted murder conviction cannot possibly be made without taking into
account the probability of the crucial criminal decision. The decision having
not as yet been made, it would be unfair to predicate liability upon it.
The second move that the immediate danger advocate with dangerousness
concerns may make is to argue that in any such situation the risk that the actor
will trigger the bomb is shown by the attendant circumstances to be high
enough to conclude that the overall danger is indeed substantial, and thus that
attempt liability is warranted.
On the dangerousness theory the only significance of criminal intent is as
an intermediate stage in the calculation of dangerousness. The evidence that the
actor brought the bomb into the building is evidence of her intent to explode it
in the building (absent other explanations). That, in turn, is evidence that she
has a dangerous propensity to pull the trigger. (People's intents change, of
course; some are firmer than others; some will have more time over which to
weaken; but that someone intends to do something that is possible for her to do
almost always adds to the probability that she will, in fact, do it.)
If liability is warranted on this basis, however, it should be warranted any
time we have a given level of confidence that a person has such a propensity
and any means available that would be a threat to life were the propensity to be
realized. Suppose, then, that we installed at thruway and bridge toll booths a
device that was highly accurate in detecting imminently homicidal propensities.
The device would focus on each driver as he or she paid the toll. When the
device alerted, we could arrest the driver for attempted murder on the theory
that the automobile is a device capable of causing death in a short time frame if
used in furtherance of a homicidal tendency Of course, no one but a member
of that mythical group-the pure subjective theorists-would be comfortable
with such a conclusion. What this shows is that the immediate danger position
is only apparently a middle position between pure subjectivism, of the
dangerousness sort, and the imposition theory Its tenability ultimately depends
upon its advocates' willingness to swallow the whole dangerousness pill.
Sufficiently good evidence of immediate dangerousness alone will support a
conviction for attempt.
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The proximate danger theorist can, of course, deny that there ever could be
a propensity predicting machine good enough to match the evidentiary force of
the circumstances attendant upon the intending bomber's apprehension. This a
priori pessimism as to the future of technology is made somewhat doubtful by
well-known and striking historical counterexamples. At the same time the
position may well be unduly optimistic as to the predictability of a decision to
trigger a bomb based upon the circumstances at the time of the bomber's arrest.
If a good prediction machine is impossible because it is impossible in principle
to predict free human choice, then of course it would be impossible to place a
probability on the bomb possessor's pulling the trigger. If the machine is
impossible because, as the behaviorist would have it, there is no such thing as a
(disambiguated) intent until the act that carries it out, then the pre-triggering
bomber likewise has no sufficiently unambiguous intent to license convicting
her.58
Whether there could actually be a good criminal propensity predicting
machine is, in any event, irrelevant. The moral questions take precedence.
Even were there such a machine, it ought not be used for imputing criminal
liability Alternatively put, insofar as any device approximated such a machine,
it ought not be so used. The moral force of this point is independent of the
possibility or impossibility of the machine. The moral objection to the use of
the machine, or a weak version of it, is equally an objection to any position that
elevates evidence of dangerousness in the future to the level of a predicate for
criminal liability In fact, a trier of fact who hears evidence of dangerousness
and is asked to conclude as to propensity, is in essence just such a machine.
(2) Depravity Version
Versions of subjectivism based on depravity rather than dangerousness are
not as likely to find the immediate danger position appealing. It is arguable,
however, that one who intends to blow up a building within the next five
minutes is more depraved than one who intends to do so within the next five
weeks. Would not, however, any such theorist also want to distinguish between
the depravity of someone who has pulled the trigger (of a bomb that fails to
explode) from someone who merely intends to do so within the next five
minutes? Perhaps there could be this sort of reply-
The failed bomber who pulled the trigger is marginally more depraved than
one who had a fixed intent to do so within five minutes. That difference nught
be reflected in sentencing. But in forming the fixed intent to cause the evil in a
short time frame, the offender had already crossed over the line. Her depravity,
58 1 am not here speaking of unambiguous evidence of the actor's intent. The evidence
need not be unambiguous, but only beyond a reasonable doubt. It must, however, be
evidence that his state of mind is one of intent, not indecision.
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though somewhat less than one who pulled the trigger, was already sufficient
for serious criminal liability at the attempted murder level.
I find this reply troubling because the difference in depravity between the
fixed intent to murder in five weeks and a similar intent to murder in five
minutes seems to me morally less substantial than the difference in depravity
between one who has a fixed intent to murder in five minutes and one who
pulls the trigger. The difference in the latter case is great because of the
importance, for depravity, of the final decision to detonate. What chiefly
distinguishes the five week from the five minute intent, by contrast, is
immediacy of danger, but that has already been dealt with.
Moreover the depravity version of the immediate danger position must also
commit to convict on the output of a machine with appropriate mental scanning
powers. In the case of the depravity theory such a machine must focus on intent
rather than propensity. For the dangerousness theory, intent is just a stepping
stone to propensity, but for the depravity theory intent is the essential predicate
of liability That difference, however, does not alter the force of the argument.
If a sufficiently good mental scanner indicates a sufficiently fixed intent to
commit a crime within a sufficiently short framework, the depravity version of
the immediate danger position would require conviction. For the reasons
already given, the moral objections to the use of such a machine, provide a
decisive reason to reject the depravity version of the position just as they did
the dangerousness version.
A closer examination of the immediate danger positions, then, shows again
that the imposition theory leaves more space for individual autonomy The step
at which the situation becomes dangerous, if not understood in the objective
fashion demanded by the imposition theory, comes down to punishing the
offender solely because of subjective dangerousness or depravity
f. The Last Step
I have not found any remaining American jurisdiction in which attempt
liability attaches only after the actor has performed the last act that he need
perform to carry out the plan.59 Though in many respects less "objective" than
the imposition theory, the last act approach was far too objective to survive the
)nslaught of modem subjective theory
It may, then, seem somewhat quixotic to distinguish different versions of
)ositions on which liability does not attach until or after the last step by the
*ctor necessary to bring about the harm. Inasmuch, however, as these positions
ave already been shown to have advantages over subjective theories with
59 See, e.g., N.Y PENAL LAW § 110.00 (McKinney 1987) ("conduct which tends to
Yect commission of such crimes"); see also statutes cited supra note 46.
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respect to the autonomy family of concerns, some investigation of them is in
order.
Last necessary steps come in four varieties, depending upon whether or not
they are irrevocable and whether or not they impose objective risk. A last step
is irrevocable if, once it is done, there is nothing that the actor can do to
diminish the probability that the harm will occur. If the harm does not occur, it
is for reasons beyond the control of the actor. Firing a bullet is almost always
an irrevocable last act. Handing a glass of poisoned tea to a victim is a
revocable last act, although it may be revocable for only that brief period
before the victim takes the first swallow
Autonomy is maximized in one respect by requiring the point of
irrevocability to be passed. It is only then that the actor has lost his last chance
to change his mind and abort his evil plan. Assuming then that the last act
position is motivated by a large concern for autonomy, the last irrevocable act
version is its natural form.
I will, however, argue against identifying attempt liability with the
occurrence of a last irrevocable act. Instead I will argue that liability should
attach if there has been an attempt, per ordinary language, and the offender's
actions have imposed a sufficient risk of what was attempted coming about.
Liability will attach to any last act that imposes sufficient objective risk,
whether the act was revocable or irrevocable.
(1) Lability for Revocable Last Acts that Impose Risk
There is a good reason to criminalize even revocable last acts that do
impose an objective risk. Suppose, for example, that the actor has lit the long,
slow-burning fuse of an explosive device. He has now done the last affirmative
act necessary to bring about the harm. Still there are several seconds during
which he could run ahead of the spark to cut the fuse. Suppose that the actor
does nothing, but that during the period of time in which he could have averted
the explosion, the fuse goes out due to other causes. Must we find the actor not
guilty of the attempt?
The answer from the perspective of the imposition theory depends upon
whether an objective risk existed at the time the actor lit the fuse. If, unknown
to the actor, the police had already cut the fuse close to the bomb, then there
never was an objective risk, and there is no criminal liability If, however, the
fuse was intact when lit, then there was an objective risk, and liability attaches.
There was an objective risk even if the actor might have been able to run ahead
and cut the fuse, because the risk arose when the fuse was lit unless it was
inevitable that he should cut it. But it could never be inevitable that he should
cut the fuse even if he formed the unshakable intention to do so iimnediatelN
after lighting the fuse, inasmuch as there would always be some possibility tha,
he would trip or have a heart attack.
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One can believe strongly m giving autonomy a maximum scope and still
believe that that scope is bounded by the principle of an actual imposition of
risk. The imposition of significant risk of serious harm violates an inportant
right of the victim-a violation that takes precedence over the actor's liberty It
is for this reason that the imposition theory is to be preferred to the Irrevocable
last act position-the more natural of the last act positions.
For these same reasons the last act position can hardly be represented as
intermediate between the pure subjective and imposition theories. In its
irrevocable last step form, this position is more protective of certain dangerous
and depraved actors than is the imposition theory
(2) No Liability for Irrevocable Last Acts that Impose no Risk
Let me turn now to those cases where the last act position would impose
liability, but the imposition theory would not. These include such cases as
shooting with a fake gun in the belief it is real, shooting at pillows in bed in the
belief they are a person, and using voodoo pins.
That an act is the last act necessary by the actor and irrevocable does not
entail any objective imposition. So far as I know, once one has stuck the pins
in a properly made voodoo doll, there is not supposed to be any way to undo
the curse. The shooter at a lump in a bed could not call out in time for the
lump to jump to safety were it a person instead of a pillow These acts are then,
irrevocable, but to criminalize these acts would restrict the actor's liberty, m
the absence of a correlative violation of the intended victim's right to life. The
victim's life was not put at risk.
Another conceivable reason to prefer the imposition theory in these cases is
the possibility that the actor subconsciously aborted his criminal plan. Suppose
that the last choice has been made, and that circumstances intervene so that
neither harm nor concrete risk ensues. The harmlessness of the attempt might
be partly the result of the fact that the actor chose to commit his crime in the
way he did because he subconsciously was aware that the plan might fail
conducted in that manner.60 Subconsciously he acted against the criminal plan.
The actor, turned defendant, could then argue that to respect his autonomy is to
respect him as a whole person, taking into account his subconscious as well as
his conscious choices.
There is some question whether subconscious choices ought to count for as
much as conscious choices in defining a person's autonomy Still, it does seem
plausible that if there is any respectable sense in which the actor chose to lessen
the risk of his behavior and if that choice led to the result that he did not
60 See Note, Why Do Cnnunal Attempts Fail? A New Defense, 70 YALE L.J. 160
(1960). This anonymously published note has been claimed by Professor Dershowitz. ALAN
M. DERSHOWnrZ, THE BEST DEFENSE (1982).
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impose upon society, to deny criminal liability is to take his autonomy as a
total person seriously To put this point in a slightly different way, because
choice is complex, and may have subconscious elements, it may rmsread the
actor's real choice to take him to have chosen something other than what
happened.
This move is implausible when the actor has chosen a means well suited to
its criminal end, has carried through proficiently, and is foiled by
circumstances that could not have been anticipated. If a heroic bystander with
sprinter speed dashes to pull the battery from a bomb the instant before it
would have exploded, the would-be bomber should not get much credit for
subconscious sabotage. By contrast, in those cases in which the actor chooses
an unsuitable means or carries it through negligently, subconscious sabotage
seems a respectable possibility
Not all harmless attempts are good candidates for the subconscious
sabotage explanation and not all cases in which subconscious sabotage is a
candidate impose no risk. There is, however, a substantial overlap. We may
well doubt the subconscious intentions of the voodoo pin stickers and those
who shoot at stumps in the "belief' that they are people. Because subconscious
sabotage is so speculative, however, I regard the present argument as less
telling than the more fundamental point that there ought be no imposition of
liability m the absence of a correlative violation of the victim's rights.
g. Summing up on Drawing the Line
What I conclude overall from surveying the different stages of an attempt
at which liability might attach, is first, that it is the imposition theory that goes
as far as we reasonably can go in giving scope to individual autonomy and
liberty interests. When we cannot reasonably go further is when increasing the
actor's scope of liberty means the imposition of an actual and objective risk on
other individuals.
Although I think the moral appeal of the imposition theory is substantial
because of its compatibility with the widest acceptable liberty, I do not want to
overstate this advantage. First, notice that criminalizing the final imposition
may well deter the actor from all the steps leading up to that imposition. No
initial segment of the steps would itself be subject to sanction, but presumably
those steps lose their point if the actor is deterred from completing the series.
In that way, all prior steps too are deterred. In particular, the actor will be just
as deterred from committing the last act that issues in an impossible attempt if
the imposition test governed, as she would be on a subjective test, assuming
always that she believes that her attempt is possible.
The advantages for autonomy justly claimable by the imposition theory are,
first, that the actor has the chance to change her mind right up to the last act of
the criminal plan, and, second, that innocent actors will not be subject to
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"over-deterrence." The actor will be less wary of engaging in actions that
might reasonably, but mistakenly, be seen as part of a criminal plan.
The examination of the various proposed stages for imposition of liability
also yields the conclusion that there is no intellectually tenable position that is
intermediate between the pure subjective theory and the pure imposition theory
The possibilities include the first step, first substantial step, first unequivocal
step, first step licensing police intervention, and first step introducing
immediate danger. None of them in the end is any more acceptable than the full
subjective theory The last act position is not genuinely intermediate between
subjective and imposition theories, and, in any event, is inferior to the
imposition theory where the two come into conflict.
3. The Rationality of the Imposition Test for Attempts
I want now to look at these liberty-autonomy issues from a more general
standpoint. Is the greater liberty that comes from not criminalizing impossible
attempts and insufficiently developed attempts something that would be rational
to choose under choice circumstances designed to promote fairness among the
members of society? Suppose that you and I are bargaining about what shape
the criminal law of our society is to take from behind a "veil of ignorance" as
to our respective positions in society Either of us may turn out to be victim or
aggressor. We both have knowledge of the degree of social aversion to the
various types of conduct that are candidates for crimnalization. 61
We pose the question whether to crimmalize an act done out of evil motive
but that imposes no risk upon the other. Prima facie we conclude against
crimnalization. To criminalize would lower my prospects if, upon lifting of the
veil, I am the aggressor, but would not raise my prospects if I am the victim.
It might be objected that my idealized choice argument, if it proves
anything, proves too much. If I am the victim, my prospects are not diminished
even by a possible attempt, so long as it is unsuccessful. Behind the veil I have
woven, would we not conclude that no attempt should be criminalized? That an
attempt imposes risk lowers my prospects only prospectively Criminal liability
attaches retrospectively The aggressor's conduct will, in any event, be guided,
if guided at all, by the primary prohibition against the completed crime. One
might reason, I do not like to have risks imposed upon me. But if the risk leads
61 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-39 (1971). Tius use of
choice behind a veil of ignorance is, of course, somewhat different from Rawls' Rawls was
concerned with pnnciples related to the basic structure of society under the assumption of
perfect compliance. What to cnmmalize is a matter of imperfect compliance theory, located
for Rawls at the constitutional or legislative stage. Using the veil, here, is then more an
adaption than an application of Rawls' device. What it is rational to choose under
circumstances of fairness is, however, of moral weight in these circumstances as well.
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to nothing, I would rather that, than suffer a criminal penalty Therefore, I will
prefer a system m which attempts are not "crimmalized." 62
The reason it would be rational, behind the veil, to crlmmalize possible
attempts is a matter of another feature of criminal justice-the need officially to
denounce criminal acts. 63 The veil does not filter out our knowledge of the
social aversion to the act that sends a bullet whizzing by an intended victim's
head. Even knowing that I rmght be the aggressor, knowing that I might not
be, gives me a good reason for wanting to live in a society m which actions
that impose this sort of objective risk are denounced through the emphatic
pronouncements of the criminal law
Denunciation through cruinal punishment, I hope and presume, has
deterrent effects. My argument here, however, does not depend upon
deterrence. The shot at the head, like the brutal rape murder, must be officially
and emphatically denounced even if such denunciation has no deterrent effect.
The denunciation must be made as a demonstration that society stands with the
victim and respects her rights.
When it comes to attempts without risk, however, the situation changes.
There is no longer a wrongful act that imposes upon any other member of
society There is not an outrage that demands denunciation. What there is, is an
exhibition of bad character. We should not, I think, risk the possibility of
criminal liability to ensure the denunciation of bad character. There is a place
for the denunciation of bad character in the less coercive sphere of moral
training.
I conclude from these general considerations that there is at least good
reason to believe that a just society would be so designed as not to crimmalize
attempts that impose no risk.
62 Of course, an unsuccessful attempt may simultaneously be a completed crime of
another description. An attempted murder is often an actual assault. By making the offender
liable for higher penalties under the attempt statute, we arguably increase the level of
deterrence against actions that lead to injury. But from behind the veil, I am equally
concerned to avoid such injuries whether they are the result of attempted murder or of
conduct of lower culpability. Therefore, the rational agreement would place the "right"
level of deterrence on the assault itself, rather than to increase that level of deterrence m a
way that has gratuitous costs for liberty in certain cases.
63 See A.C. EWING, THE MORALrrY OF PUNISHMENT 32-35 (1929); JOEL
FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 118 (1970); IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL
PUNIsHMENT 149-54 (1989); JAMES FrrZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW IN ENGLAND, vol. II, 81-82, 207 (1883); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE
48-49 (1976); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FTrrURE CRIMES (1985); Jean Hampton,
The Moral Education Theory of Pumshtnent, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF 208 (1984).
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F The Conflict Between Subjective Theones and Legality
After quoting the Model Penal Code's "substantial step" language and that
of the English statute of 1981, requiring something more than "mere
preparation," Fletcher wonders m print "whether these pronouncements are
meant as a satire on the principles of legality and fair-warmng." 64 The point is
that when we lack objective imposition as a touchstone, the arbitrary line
drawn at some point along the stages of the process of execution will inevitably
be represented by a verbal formula of great vagueness. Fletcher's own
unequivocality or "manifest criminality" formula suffers from the same
disease.
The problem is not that the subjectivists have been inadequate wordsmiths.
The problem is not one of language but of the reality the language seeks to
capture. Steps towards the execution of a crime are just too vaned m nature
and shade into each other in ways that are far too subtle for us to expect to find
a single nonvague verbal formula that would acceptably draw the line between
liability and nonliability To have any chance of capturing the liability
intuitions of subjectivists, the verbal formula must have considerable flexibility
But, of course, this flexibility is bought at the cost of legality and notice. The
simple truth is that when any version of the subjective theory holds sway, a
potential offender can have no confidence as to how much conduct towards the
commission of a crime will be sufficient to constitute an attempt-unless there
happens to be a case directly on point.
The imposition theory avoids this problem by declining to draw a line
across the stages of execution. The line is drawn on the side of the results of
conduct. In case of attempt, the results are, of course, risks rather than ijunes.
That introduces an issue of the definability of risk, but as I will shortly
demonstrate, that is a problem of definition far more tractable than
distinguishing between preparation and attempt.
G. The Conflict Between Subjective Theories and Retributive Justice
This section will develop more specific reasons for believing that it would
be fundamentally unfair to criminalize attempts that impose no risk. I will
argue that to do so would violate deep principles of retributive justice-
principles that are essential to society's license to punish offenders.
The state has. one or more purposes in pumshmg. Among the most
plausible candidate purposes are the control of crime, the denunciation of
criminal acts, the vindication of the rights of victims, and the satisfaction of a
social desire that wrongdoers suffer. For the state justly to pumsh a person for
64 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 60.
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any or all of these purposes it must have a morally satisfactory license to treat
the offender in ways that would otherwise violate his rights.65
How does the state acquire this license? The possible answers to this
question can be divided into two branches, the second of which will branch
again.
1. The Implausibility of a Utilitarian License to Punish
The first possibility is utilitarianism. Because it redounds to the social good
to punish the offender, he has no right not to be punished. In effect, no license
is required. This approach supports a pure subjective theory of criminal
liability Sufficient evidence that someone is dangerous would permit society to
impose upon him so long as the expected costs of doing so are less than the
expected costs of leaving him alone. There is no a priori limit on the sort of
evidence of dangerousness to be taken into account or on the severity of the
punishment.
I will attempt no refutation of utilitarianism in this paper. I will here only
remind the reader how radical is the hypothesis that citizens have no rights
against the state when it comes to criminal punishment, or equivalently, have
only rights that disappear the instant punishment becomes socially useful. This
conception is in fundamental conflict both with the spirit of criminal law and
with our sense of the unique worth of the individual.
2. The Implausibility of a Consent-Based License to Punish
The second branch of potential justifications for state intrusion upon the
individual in criminal punishment relies upon the proposition that the offender's
moral status changes when he committs an offense. The offender "forfeits"
certain rights. Some such notion of forfeiture has been a centerpiece of
retributive theories of punishment, and has seemed intuitive enough to many
nonretributivists. 66 But to say that there has been a forfeiture of rights does
little more than restate the problem. By virtue of what does the offender forfeit
rights, and what is the scope of that forfeiture?
There are two possibilities to pursue. The first is the theory that the
offender has impliedly consented to his punishment. The second is that it is not
65 See W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD, 56-64 (1930); Alan H. Goldman,
The Paradox ofPunishment, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF 42, 44 (1979).
66 See DAVID HuME, INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, § III, part
I, 10 (C. Hendel ed. 1957); Ross, supra note 65, at 60-63; GEORGE SHER, DESERT 84
(1987); Goldman, supra note 65, at 44-45; Christopher Moms, Pumshment and the Loss of
Moral Standards, 21 CANADIAN J. OF PHIL. 53, 63 (1991); Ernest van den Haag,
Puntshment: Desert and Crime Control, 85 MICH. L. REV 1250, 1255 (1987).
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unfair to punish him, without his consent, because in so doing the state does
nothing more than reciprocate for the offense.
There is some plausibility to the theory that the offender's forfeiture is a
member of the waiver or consent family of concepts. The offender voluntarily
committed the offense with at least constructive notice of the penalty Why
should he not be held to that penalty9 The theory need not contend that there is
express consent, so long as committing the criminal act has the moral force of
consent.
Strong versions of the consent theory take the offender to have consented
impliedly to any penalty permitted under the criminal code or to any such
penalty that has utilitarian justification. 67 Alternatively, the forfeiture may be
limited by a proportionality requirement among offenders, as well as by
consequences. 68
Whatever plausibility implied consent may have as a justification of
criminal punishment, it surely can have no more force than genuine consent.
This entails that there be good constructive notice and reasonable offender
capacity It also follows that the whole notion of Implied consent becomes
terribly inplausible for severe penalties. In brief, for severe penalties, the
consent imputed through the commission of the criminal act becomes too unlike
true consent to retain any of the moral force of such consent. Implied consent
to severe penalties suffers from the same pathology as do unconscionable
contracts.
3. The Reciprocity-Based License to Punish and the Imposition
Requirement
If the crucial criminal forfeiture is not a matter of a member of the consent
family, and thereby of the potential penalty of which the offender is on notice,
it must be found in some feature more intrinsic to the criminal act. The degree
of wrongfulness of the offense is the natural candidate for measuring the extent
of the offender's forfeiture and therefore of the state's license to treat the
offender in ways that would otherwise violate her rights. The severity of what
the state may do to the offender will be a function of the seriousness of what
the offender has done to her victims. This is a form of the moral principle of
reciprocity Reciprocity principles have long been associated with justice in
criminal punishment.69
67 See, e.g., Carlos Nino, A Consensual Theory of Pumshnent, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF
289 (1983).
68 See, e.g., HART, supra note 8, at 22-25.
69 See, e.g., Leviticus 24:19-20; ARisTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V, ch. 4 (W.D.
Ross trans., 1980); GODFREY R. DRIVER & JOHN C. MILEs, THE BABYLoIAN LAWS 76-
93 §§ 196, 197, 200, 210, 229, 230 (1935); IMMANUEL KANT, THE MErAPHYSICAL
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Criminal punishment visits an imposition upon the offender, sometimes a
very severe imposition. No such imposition could be licensed under a
reciprocity principle unless the offense was itself an imposition. The only
principles of reciprocity that will pass the test of fairness are principles on
which what is reciprocated is sufficiently like what is being reciprocated. It is
not unfair to give tit for tat. It is unfair to make a serious imposition upon one
who seriously imposed upon no one.
The conclusion of the first part of this article is, then, that withholding
criminal liability from attempts that inpose no risk is supported by the
structure of the existing criminal law, by the desideratum of theory
completeness in liability ascription, by the logic of criminal responsibility, by
the meaning of "attempt," by the importance of liberty and autonomy, by the
nonexistence of satisfactory options intermediate between the subjective and
imposition theories, and, most importantly, by retributive justice and the
fundamental unfairness of Imposing so seriously upon one who has not
imposed upon society
III. APPLICATION OF THE IMPOSmON THEORY TO IMPOSSIBLE
ATteMPTS: CHARACTERIZING RISK
A. The Problem
On the theory of this article an attempt ought only be punishable if it
constitutes an imposition. No attempt is an imposition in one straightforward
sense. None results in the concrete harm intended. 70 If unsuccessful attempts
are to count as impositions, it must be because they impose nsk upon some
person or group of persons. I understand a possible attempt as one that, if
pursued far enough, gives rise to immediate, objective risk. Impossible
attempts fail to do so. 71 It is because, and only because, possible attempts
impose risk that it is proper to crimalize them.
One way of putting the task that remains, then, is to distinguish possible
from impossible attempts in a fashion consonant with the imposition theory of
criminal liability Alternatively stated, it is to give an account of the proper
concept of imposed "risk."
This is not a trivial undertaking, but it is a good deal easier than what the
accepted tradition must do to distinguish between those attempts that do and do
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101 (John Ladd trans., 1965); Ross, supra note 65, at 16-47, 56-
64.
70 Put aside the fact that most convictions for attempts occur in cases m which the
crime was m fact completed, but the defendant plea bargained down to the attempt charge.
71 There may well be senses of the word "possible" that are not congruent with my
distinction which is intended to provide a theoretically sound reconstruction of the notion of
an "impossible criminal attempt."
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not give rise to liability Partisans of that tradition who do any hard thinking on
the issues soon find themselves enmeshed in a web of distinctions involving
factual impossibility, legal impossibility, mixed impossibility, reasonable
beliefs, unreasonable beliefs, highly unreasonable beliefs, and often divisions
and subdivisions within these categories. The most insightful accounts of this
exercise in drawing and rationalizing distinctions, demonstrate just how
difficult an enterprise it is.72 Fact situations slip with protean ease from one
category to another depending upon how the attempt is described. The ensuing
complexity, and I would say confusion, are largely the result of the fact that
most people would respond to hypothetical cases with a compromise between
the subjective and imposition theories. As we have seen, however, there is no
intellectually sound compromise.
On the imposition theory, these traditional distinctions are unnecessary
We need ask only if there is an imposition of risk, under the appropriate
concept of risk. For example, even before we begin our examination of the
notion of risk, it will, I hope, be plausible that the purchase of nonstolen goods
imposes no concrete and immediate risk upon anyone, even if the purchaser
believes them to have been stolen.
In certain sorts of cases it is not necessary to do any considerable analysis
of the concept of risk appropriate to the imposition theory These are attempts
whose impossibility turns on the absence of any suitable candidate victim, upon
whom the risk, however characterized, might be said to be imposed. Consider
the malevolent hunter who, deep in the wilderness, sees a tree stump of human
shape, believes that it is a human being, a stranger to her, and fires at it.
Because there is no person that she intended to shoot, there is no one about
whom the question can even be asked whether he was put at risk. There is a
fortiori no imposition upon anyone; no violation of anyone's rights.
Things are not, however, always this easy for the imposition theory In
cases with identifiable intended victims, the theory must provide a suitable
account of immediate risk so that it may be determined whether any such risk
was imposed on the intended victims. Just what concept of risk is it that is
suitable to this task? First, it follows from the logic of the imposition theory
that the appropriate concept of risk must be objective. It cannot be risk from
the point of view of the actor, else voodoo pin sticking would count as
imposing risk.
But is there such a thing as objective risk? Lawyers and those schooled in
the social sciences are, I think, typically skeptical of the idea of objective risks
or probabilities. Their paradigm is that something is more or less probable to a
72 See Fletcher, supra note 12; Graham Hughes, One Further Footnote on Attempting
the Impossible, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv 1005 (1967); Kenneth W Simons, Mistake and
Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 447 (1990).
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particular person on given evidence. One need not, however, deny that there
are subjective and other epistemic notions of probability and risk, useful m
many settings, to assert that there are also objective probabilities and risks. The
curve of a newly built road may be dangerous even though no one has yet
recognized it and the statistics that will evidence its danger lie some distance in
the future.73 A given gambling die may be a fair die, m that the probability of
any face turning up on a vigorous role is very close to one in six, even if the
die has never been and never will be rolled. There are large areas of legal
doctrine that are utterly dependent upon the concept of objective risk-products
liability to name only one of the more obvious. In fact, a little reflection shows
that the notions of negligence and recklessness cannot be understood without
reference to an objective concept of risk.
I could, at this point, bring this article to a close by appropriating the
concept of risk under which tortiously negligent acts are said to impose risk.74
If the concept is sufficient to support a theory of tort law, then it should also be
enough to make respectable the imposition theory's account of attempts. I shall
not take this easy way out for two reasons. First, there are some genuine
puzzles about the application of the concept of objective risk to attempts that
require a solution before I would expect the reader to accept that I can
distinguish between possible and impossible attempts in the way that I purport
to do. Second, I need a finer-grained account of risk before I can say in a
number of hard cases whether there ought to be criminal liability
To start into the analysis of the appropriate concept of risk, let me indulge
for a moment in the very large assumption that the world is physically
determimstic. This assumption is designed to make the going difficult for an
objective sense of risk. On this assumption, the bullet that misses the victim's
head by an inch inposed no risk in the fundamental physical sense. From no
prior state of the world was it physically possible in this sense that the bullet
would strike the victim. Given determinism, what fails to happen is impossible
in the sense of possibility defined in terms of what is permitted under physical
law from actual state descriptions.
Now, I neither know whether physical determinism is true, nor if false
how much play there is in the laws of nature. A good current guess might be
that the world is not deterministic, but that for macro-level phenomena there is
little or no room for physically possible events that do not occur. Thus the
probability in the fundamental physical sense of the close miss bullet's hitting
may be zero, on fundamental physical probabilities, even if determinism is
false.75 What this shows is the prudence, if not the necessity, of defining
73 Of course those future statistics cannot be what it is for the curve to be dangerous,
because the curve nught be fixed before the statistics would have started coming m.
74 See, e.g., George P Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV L.
REv 537 (1972).
75 See FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 80-81.
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objective risk for criminal liability purposes independently of that paradigm of
objectivity-fundamental physical probabilities.
B. The Ideal Observer
As just discussed, we can define risk neither in terms of the subjective
expectations of the attemptor, nor m terms of fundamental physical probability
How, then, are we to define it? I agree with Fletcher76 that it is helpful in
working out the definition to make use of the services of an idealized observer.
This observer is distantly related to the Reasonably Prudent Person of tort law
and to the Ideal Observers of certain moral theories.77 My claim is that if an
action would seem to impose a risk to a suitably characterized observer, then
the associated attempt is a possible attempt for the purposes of the criminal law
(The observer is really a metaphor for the evaluation of the probability
threshold and for a particular construction of a state description.)
The characterization of the observer involves specifying what question the
observer is to answer, what knowledge she has, from what vantage points she
makes her observations, and what observational aids she has at her disposal.
First, what question is the observer to answer? The unanalyzed question is:
"Did this attempt impose a risk (of the sort intended by the actor) on anyone?"
Let us try to flesh this out in frequency terms: "If this attempt were repeated
1000 times in such and such fashion would it result in the concrete harm
intended by the agent at least once?" The "such and such fashion" is the
observer's description of the act, as derived from her observation. I will call
this a description of the "conditions of repetition" under which the probability
is to be generated.
The 1000 to 1 probability ratio is obviously arbitrary, but something of the
sort is needed, as the following hypothetical will show Suppose that Janis puts
on a ghastly mask and runs yelling at people on the street. Being a bad sort,
she does so with the hope and purpose of causing death by fright. In fact, one
in every 25 million potential victims would have a fatal heart attack if exposed
to Janis' conduct. Put aside what Janis should be charged with if she happens to
succeed or if she knows that she has a particularly susceptible victim. Also put
aside such lesser charges as harassment or menacing that Janis may be guilty of
in typical cases by causing some mild consternation. Janis would not, in the
typical case, be guilty of attempted murder. There is some risk, but the risk is
too low for the law of homicide to take cognisance of it.
76 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 65. I will fill in answers to some questions Fletcher left
open about the ideal observer, although no doubt m a somewhat different way than Fletcher
would.
77 JAMEs S.C. REID, LAW AND THE REASONABLE MAN (1968); Roderick Firth,
Etlucal Absolutism and the Ideal Observer, 12 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
317 (1952); Elmo Schwab, The Quest for the Reasonable Man, 45 TEX. B.J. 178 (1982).
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Exactly how much risk m quantitative terms is enough, is a function of the
seriousness of the concrete harm intended. The law does, and ought, look the
other way for higher risks if the harm intended is minor than if death is
intended. Thus the ratio aspect of the question for the observer should be
phrased: "If the conduct is repeated n times would it give rise to a concrete
harm at least once?" where n is set by the substantive criminal law for each
primary offense.
With respect to her knowledge base, our observer ought be armed with our
best current physical theories, including the relevant branches of engineering. It
would err on the side of subjectivism to adopt the agent's physical theory It
would be unfair to make the agent criminally liable on the grounds that his act
was risky on a discarded theory if not risky on our best current theory
For similar reasons, the observer should be thought of as making her
observations at all relevant points along the line of the transaction up to the last
act of the agent. She has all the information that the agent has, but lacks his
nusinformation.
Obviously, however, the observer cannot be omniscient. Omniscience
would, again, risk reducing all probabilities to, or close to, 0 and 1. The chief
limitation on the observer is that she ought not to be thought of as having
instruments to boost her powers of observation. She has no microscope, no
instruments of chemical analysis, no transit, no x-ray, no wind gauge. She is,
like the reasonable person of tort law, very much a macro-level creature-able
to observe those things that ordinary people can observe if m the right place.
Although it introduces some complexities, the observer should be permitted
to describe the conditions of repetition to include the intent of the actor to the
extent that such intent will be inferable by the jury either from the nature of the
action or from defendant's statements or other ancillary evidence. Thus it
would be a proper description that the actor was "shooting at the victim's head
or upper body" from such and such position. The observer would not be
restricted to a description of the angle of the gun barrel.
This "shooting at" element of intent is, after all, a determination that the
jury must make, m any event, in order to convict. By including it in the
description of the conditions of repetition we avoid the unintuitive result of an
acquittal m the case that the actor, though trying his best, was such a poor shot
that the observer could see immediately that the shot would miss. Such a shot,
described even m macro-level detail, would give rise to conditions of repetition
under which every retrial would mss. If our actor, however, were given
several chances to shoot at the victim from where he was standing, he would
succeed on some of them.
Does including this intent element in the description of the conditions of
repetition place us on a slippery slope at the bottom of which is the voodoo pin
sticker? Having permitted a component of the actor's intentions into the
description, have we a principled basis for refusing to accept the description,
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"trying to kill the victim" ) If the pm sticker is bound only by that repetition
description, we presumably sooner or later wind up with a corpse.
We need not, however, take one more step down the slope than supplies us
with acceptable conclusions. The principle that stops the descent is the guiding
idea that an attempt must be an imposition. To determine if an act constitutes
an imposition of risk, we need a fairly detailed description of the act. The
description, "trying to kill," without more, is not a candidate. We get a better,
not a worse, description for the purpose of assessing risk, if we include
"shooting at" as part of the description. But to omit such details as where the
assailant was standing and what weapon he was using would degrade the
description for the purposes of risk assessment. Therefore we decline to take
those steps down the slope.
For the observer to include any intent element, even a thin one, m her
repetition description, will conflict with some judicial enforcement of the rule
that non-experts should testify as to "facts" not "inferences." Despite the
counsel of the authorities,78 some judges will sustain an objection to a witness
statement that the defendant was "shooting at the victim." Preferring the
witness to say that "the pistol was pointed in the direction of the victim."
Similarly, there is a preference for seeing pale, shaking victims, rather than
frightened victims. The judges are wrong on that point, however. Psychology
and phenomenology, as well as one's own experience, teach that human beings
often see (are immediately aware without conscious inference) people shooting
at each other, just as they see angry people and fearful people.79 They are often
quite unable to describe all the features of the person observed that were
involved in their seeing the person as fearful or as shooting at the victim.
Let us take a further look at the conditions of repetition through
characteristics of the observer. By virtue of observing every relevant temporal
stage of the transaction, the observer will see the sugar going into the rat
poison box, even if this occurs months or years before powder from that box is
put in a teacup. Because of her lack of instruments to perform a chemical
analysis, however, the observer will not pick up the fact that a poison was
mixed in very slightly incorrect proportions. If the poison will fail or the victim
will survive being pushed from the window for reasons of physiology that go
beyond gross observations of age, size, and the like, the observer will not
include such details in the conditions of repetition. She will generate her risk
statistics by assuming a statistically fair sample of people with the observable
macro features of the victim.
78 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 23-24 (1972); JOHN H.
WIGMORE, 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1919 (1985).
79 See generally NoRWOOD RUSSELL HANSON, PATrERNS OF DISCOVERY 1-30
(1958); WOLFGANG KoHLER, GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY (1929).
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Observers akin to the Reasonable Person are rarely sketched in quite this
detail. 80 Once the sketch is attempted, it is likely to appear a little arbitrary at
points. From a metaphysical point of view it is arbitrary Bear in mind,
however, that the characteristics of the present ideal observer are not driven by
metaphysics or epistemology They are instead the reflection of normative
concerns inherent m criminal law theory The idea is to come up with an
observer whose pronouncements will correspond to our intuitions about the
sorts of states of affairs that ought to be taken to be criminally punishable risks.
The restriction of the observer to the macro-level and the inclusion of thin
intent descriptions, such as "shooting at," serve the intuitions that criminal
liability ought to arise from the bullet that comes close to the head and the
poison, the stab, or the fall that would kill some people who look very like the
victim.
There is also a theoretical justification for structuring the observer as
described. Because human beings, for almost their entire history as a species,
have been restricted to the macro level, and because most of us spend most of
our time operating at the macro level, our moral and legal principles are geared
to the macro level. In addition we see people point pistols at others' heads.
Such "pre-interpreted" perception is, again, part of the ordinary world for
ordinary people. It is the stuff from which both morality and law emerge.
For similar reasons, an analysis of the notion of objective probability for
gambling devices properly takes place at the macro-level. An exceptionally
exacting micro-analysis might determine that the probability of a 7 on a
particular play of a roulette wheel was 1, whereas the sort of macro-level
analysis appropriate to a gaming commission investigator would find the
probability of a 7 to be 1/32. We gamble at the macro-level. Macro-level
fairness is compatible with micro-level predictability We assess risk for moral
and legal purposes at the macro-level. Macro-level risk is compatible with a
micro-level predictability of no injury
C. Some Applications
A certain set of stock hypotheticals turn up in nearly every discussion of
criminal attempts. I will run my ideal observer through some of these cases to
illustrate the way I distinguish between possible and impossible attempts, and
to show when certain other theories go wrong. I do not expect immediate
agreement with my own conclusions on each of these hypotheticals. Intuitions
80 See M. Naeem Rauf, The Reasonable Man Test in the Defence of Provocation:
What Are the Reasonable Man's Attributes and Should the Test be Abolished?, 30 CRIM. L.
Q. 73 (1987); see e.g., Dolores Donovon & Stephame Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man
Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LoY. L.A. L. REV




are very mixed on these cases. Indeed, as I have suggested, I believe that most
commentators have mconsistent intuitions across the range of standard cases.
The root of the inconsistency is an attempt to combine the uncombiable-the
pure subjective and pure imposition theories. As the reader subjects her
intuitions and theory to critical examination, I would expect an increasing level
of agreement on the hypotheticals.
It is a theorem of the imposition theory that if something is absent that is
necessary for the imposition of risk, then there is no punishable attempt.
Among the necessary items that may be missing are operable guns, poisons,
stolen goods, controlled substances, dutiable imports, and victims. In each case
the actor has good reason to believe that the item is present. Because he has
such good reason, he is revealed to be just as dangerous and wicked a person
as if it were present, and for this subjective theories find him liable. Depending
on the case, theories advertised as antisubjective may find hun liable as well.si
The imposition theory will generally find no liability, unless the essential item
is "missing" only in an undetectable way
I will first consider missing victim cases, divided into two subgroups. In
the first, there is no potential living victim at all. In the second, there is an
identifiable victim, but one who is arguably out of harm's way
1. No Victim Cases
It is at the heart of the imposition theory that there is no crime unless
someone's rights have been violated. It follows that in any case in which there
is no appropriate victim, there can be no liability This principle sometimes
can, and must, be applied without employing the ideal observer device.
Consider, for example, two cases on which the present account conflicts
with that of Fletcher. Fletcher would find attempted rape if the apparent victim
were in fact dead or if the apparent victim consented.82 The dead victim case is
a particularly dramatic example of a victimless prosecution of a crime that
requires a victim. It is, again, as if a hunter with a homicidal streak shot at a
stump in the belief that it was a human being, but without any idea who it
might be. There is no particular individual who is even a candidate to have had
his or her rights violated by his action. It cannot be presented as a risk to
anyone m particular in even the most extended sense of risk.
In the dead victim case, the offender has attempted to commit a rape within
the ordinary language meaning of "attempt." However, the attempted rape of a
corpse is not "an objectively dangerous act that treads upon the rights of
81 See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 12, at 209.
82 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 63.
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others." 83 That is, it does not tread on such rights by creating a danger of rape,
for there was no one faced with such a danger.84
I do not doubt that sexual relations with a corpse can be crunialized, and
that such criminalization may be in part justified by an interest of the deceased
in the integrity of her body, which interest survives her death. I would also
grant that a belief that the victim was alive ought not to be a defense to the
offense of necrophilia. This, however, is not a matter of the logic of attempts,
but is simply an instance of the principle that it is no defense that one intended
a greater harm.85
The non-apparent consent case in its purest form raises similar issues.
Suppose that the apparent victim of a rape had written two days previously to
the defendant. She expressed an unconditional consent to sexual intercourse
with hun, but warned him that she would feign considerable resistance, as a
matter of her own preference. The letter was delivered a day too late. The
apparent victim, however, remained true to her unread declaration, her
resistance was realistic, but entirely play acting.
In this case, presumably, the apparent victim would testify for the
prosecution only under subpoena. She would maintain that there was not and
could not logically have been any "treading" on her rights. Her testimony
would, however, convict the defendant of attempt under the Model Penal
Code.86 That Fletcher would agree, shows how far his subjectivist "bespeaking
criminality" dominates his nascent imposition theory, stated in terms of the
objective danger of a rights violation.87
2. Victims in Places of Safety
In many standard hypotheticals, there is an identifiable intended victim,
and the question becomes whether the offender's action generated a risk that
violated the rights of that intended victim in the appropriate way For this
analysis the ideal observer is called to work.
Gross, though a self-professed member of the "objective" camp,
understands there to be a "true threat of harm" when the actor shoots into a
bed late at night, not knowing that its usual occupant is a thousand miles
83 Id.
84 Because there was no one who could have been faced with any risk of rape, there is
no place for application of the ideal observer heuristic, the point of which is to assess
objective risk. It is, therefore, not a counterexample to the present theory that it might
require a microscopic examination to determine whether a victim was dead or alive. If the
victim is dead, however difficult that may be to determine, she is not at risk for invasion of
rights that one has only when alive.
85 See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 4, at 222.
86 MODELPENAL CODE § 5.01(l)(a) (1985).
87 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
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away 88 1 am tempted to wonder whether, with objectivists like this, there is
any need for subjectivists. My ideal observer, m any event, would know that
the intended victim was well out of harm's way, and that no immediate and
concrete risk could possibly have been imposed upon him.
The situation becomes more puzzling if the shooter is chasing the victim
through the woods, temporarily loses sight of him, then makes out four
roughly humanoid shapes m the gathering dusk. One of them is m fact the
victim. Another is a tree stump, and it is at the latter that the shot is fired. This
is parallel to an example Gross suggests of an actor who, intent on stealing one
of ten umbrellas m a pile, happens to take the one that she owns.89 Certainly m
the latter case and probably m the former, it is fair to say that there was an
immediately present concrete risk of the substantive crime of theft or homicide,
respectively The ideal observer should delineate the conditions of repetition in
the umbrella case as she would a case in which the actor draws a number out of
a hat. (As a practical matter, in some such cases the ideal observer could only
arrive at conditions of repetition of this sort on the basis of a confession.)
When the shooter might just as well have shot at the victim as the stump,
there ought to be liability When the victim is secreted behind a rock, there
ought not be. What if the intended victim is in fact within the range of a shot
from where the shooter stands, but is so positioned as to seem part of a tree,
while the stump could easily be mistaken to be a human being? Presumably the
shooter will aim at the stump. The ideal observer, then, should include in her
conditions of repetition some such description as "shooting at apparently
human shapes." Then there should be liability only if the victim is among the
apparently human shapes from the shooter's perspective.
3. Defective Means Cases
The victim may not be m a safe place, but nonetheless may be safe because
the actor selected a defective means. Consider, again, the would-be poisoner
who adds to his aunt's tea a healthy tablespoon of white powder taken from a
freshly opened box labeled "Arsenic-Rat Poison." It happens that the box
contains only sugar, which by way of explanation is used to cut the arsenic in
the rat poison plant. A worker set a control to the wrong position. This box of
"rat poison" then creates no actual physical risk. The would-be poisoner could
shovel as much the contents of this box into the aunt's tea as he could get away
with, without her ever being at all at risk. The ideal observer, knowing the
history of the box, would know this, which is to say that the conditions of
repetition would be limited to boxes containing sugar. Because there is no
imposition of risk, there is no attempt.
88 GROSS, supra note 12, at 216.
89 Id. at 205.
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Here Gross would, I think, again side with the subjectivists. He would
admit that there is no risk m the specific physical situation, but would say that
there is here a "threat of actual harm" because such harm is "expectable" on
the defendant's conduct. Its expectability, m turn, is premised on the
defendant's having a reason to believe that the harm will occur. 90 Here, of
course, the would-be poisoner has quite a good reason indeed to believe that
the powder is arsemc.
In short, Gross would argue for a broader set of conditions of repetition.
The poisoner would spoon out powder from a wide sample of "rat poison"
boxes superficially identical to the box in question. My conditions of repetition
are limited to the particular box. On most of his repetitions the aunt ends up
dead; on mine she suffers a slight sugar high.
How do we decide which conditions of repetition are the appropriate ones?
It is a matter of the normative theory of attempt liability The broader set of
repetition conditions is the correct one to use if one's concern is the evaluation
of the character of the actor. Suppose, however, that one believes, for the
reasons advanced in the first part of this Article, that an actor may be as
depraved or dangerous as you like, but will not be criminally liable unless he
imposes upon someone. The crucial question then becomes whether the aunt's
rights were violated.91
It would, of course, be too thin a conception of the aunt's rights to take
them to be violated only if she is physically harmed. The intentional creation of
a physically dangerous situation that she happens to survive unscathed ought to
count as an invasion of her rights. But this consideration will not take us
beyond present physical risk. That is why the imposition theory would limit the
conditions of repetition as outlined. This is not because there is no respectable
sense of "risk" corresponding to a wider set of repetition conditions, but
because such senses of "risk" are of interest only for purposes that ought to be
irrelevant for criminal liability
The restriction to the macro level is what insures a set of conditions of
repetition such that pushing the victim out of a third story window will result in
a potential attempted murder charge, as will admimstering a jolt of electricity
which would not, m fact, ever be enough to kill the actual victim. It is
sufficient if such a jolt would sometimes kill others who outwardly resemble
the victim. For similar reasons, although a woman cannot be liable for
attempted rape as a principal, an impotent man can be.92
90 Id. at 226.
91 Fletcher reaches the conclusion that the description should be narrow in service of
"liberal concerns for protecting privacy." GROSS, supra note 12, at 66. Privacy is part and
parcel of the autonomy concerns I discuss above. The other arguments of the first part of
this article substantially buttress the conclusion.
92 See Preddy v. Commonwealth, 36 S.E.2d 549 (Va. 1946) (conviction of impotent
man for attempted rape upheld).
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Most defective weapons will not give rise to liability The exception would
be those weapons that one could not tell would fail even had one watched the
construction and subsequent history of the weapon. Defective bullets, so far as
I know, typically fall into this exception.
In the case of Fletcher's invisible shield between shooter and victim 93 there
will be no liability, assuming that the shield could be discovered by macro-level
observations. Fletcher would find liability in this case, which seems odd from
an objective standpoint. After all, the victim is at no greater risk than if he
were not on the other side of the shield at all, but instead a three dimensional
likeness were projected on the shield.
We would get a different result if instead of a shield, extraterrestrials were,
undetectably, standing by ready to vaporize any bullet that would otherwise
strike the victim. Suppose with such extraterrestrials on guard, a bullet just
missed the victim's head. Because advanced extraterrestrial technology detected
that it would miss, the bullet was left to its course. There was, however, in one
sense no risk to the victim. Had the bullet been on target, it would have been
harmlessly vaporized. My ideal observer, limited to the macro level, will fail to
capture this sort of risk. This "failure" is all to the good. Potential
interferences of this undetectable and wholly extraordinary sort take us too far
away from the common sense world in which criminal liability operates. There
was here risk as we understand risk. We should no more withdraw that
judgment upon hearing extraterrestrial testimony than we should were a
physicist to say that there was no risk because of the precise angle at which the
pistol was held.
4. Noncontraband Cases
My ideal observer would know the history of goods purchased by a fence.
Thus when the goods were not stolen, the conditions of repetition would
include only nonstolen goods. There is then neither a receiving of stolen goods
nor any objective risk thereof. I, therefore, would endorse the result in People
v. Jaffe, for this more fundamental reason, as well as for the reason that the
purchase was not an ordinary language "attempt. " 94
Gross argues that whether this is the correct outcome depends upon
legislative intent. A certain legislative perspective in criminafizing the receipt of
stolen goods would entail, he maintains, attempt liability even if the goods are
not stolen.
93 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 58.
9 4 People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y 1906); see supra notes 33-39 and
accompanying text.
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If the business practices of receivers of stolen goods were deemed in
themselves a threat of harm to be dealt with criminally, then whether or not
goods received were in fact stolen would not matter for attempt liability, so
long as the goods were being received as stolen goods.95
I agree that some of the business practices of fences could be made
crimnal. Perhaps purchasing goods without proper documentation is such a
practice. If this is the legislative intent, it could and should be turned into
explicit statutory language. It is hard to see, however, how this could be a fair
reading of a statute that nominally criminalizes something completely
different-the receipt of stolen property Moreover, if it were the intent of the
legislature that receiving goods without proper documentation be crimnal, and
if that were a fair interpretation of the statutory language, then such conduct
should be prosecutable as the substantive offense itself, rather than simply its
attempt. It will not do to say that the statute criminalizes one thing and that an
attempt at it crimnmalizes something utterly different.
Of course I do not deny that a state could add to its jurisprudence the
principle that one who buys goods in the belief that they are stolen is to be
liable for attempted receipt of stolen goods. Subjectivist principles can be
imposed by brute legislative force, so to speak, as actually happened in New
York in the legislative overruling of Jaffe.96 The Model Penal Code goes quite
out of its way to mandate a subjective theory of attempts. 97 Such legislation is
unjust, but not unconstitutional. In any event, I doubt that such subjectivist
direction can ever be fairly found to be implicit in the elements of such
substantive offenses as receipt of stolen property
These considerations apply directly to cases of attempts to smuggle
nondutiable lace and attempts to possess a substance that is not in fact
controlled. It makes no difference from the point of view of the imposition
theory whether the defendant's mistake was about the contents of the customs
or controlled substance list or the history or chemical properties of the items in
question. There is no immediate risk of anything that the law forbids, and
hence no offense.
There is no attempt to sell a controlled substance if what is sold is not a
controlled substance. The imposition theory would not, however, find
objectionable a crime defined as selling a purported controlled substance. There
would be a violation of such a statute whether or not the substance was actually
controlled, and whether or not the seller knew its true nature. The only
requirement would be that the seller held it out as a substance that is controlled.
The reason that this is a permissible offense is that something is imposed upon
5 GROSS, supra note 12, at 202.
96 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.10 (McKinney 1987).
97 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(a) (1985).
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the buyer whether the substance is controlled or not: the dangers of the
controlled substance or a sale on materially false information.
IV CONCLUSION
My purpose m this article has been to argue for an imposition theory of
crminal liability The theory does not deny that mental culpability has a role m
criminal liability What sets the theory of this article apart is its insistence that
an imposition that violates the rights of some person or persons is a necessary
condition for any proper ascription of criminal liability This thesis has
implications throughout the criminal law I have focused here on cruinal
attempts, because attempts, and particularly harmless attempts, are an ideal test
case for the imposition theory It is a corollary of the theory that impossible
attempts and most interrupted attempts, because they impose no immediate
objective risk, ought not be subject to criminal liability
There may sometimes be crime control advantages to punishing interrupted
and inpossible attempts. We should, however, forego those advantages for
reasons that go deep into the conception of a just and free society Most
fundamentally, society lacks any moral license to impose a crimnal sanction
upon anyone who has not herself imposed by violating the rights of some other
person or persons. Second, a society with proper respect for liberty and
autonomy will not bring the heavy hand of the criminal law down at any earlier
stage than necessary m the chain of steps leading towards the final harm.
It is at this point that commentators have tried to work a balance of security
and liberty interests by compromising between the pure subjective and pure
imposition theones. This Article argues that any such compromise is
intellectually unstable. In the end, one must either embrace the imposition
theory or be prepared, m principle, to embrace the findings of a machine that
measures mental depravity or predicts future dangerousness.
The traditional criminal law was systematically sensitive to the values of
retributive justice and autonomy for which the subjective theories have so little
regard. It is precisely these vital values that the "modem" commentators want
to see "reformed" out of the criminal law These reforms are not mere fine
tuning. Subjectivism's conflict with the body of criminal law is thorough, deep,
and a matter of principle, not detail. Indeed, reflection on the conflict between
subjectivism and the concept of criminal responsibility will show that a
consistently subjectivist theory of crime control would not be a system of
criminal justice at all, but rather social therapy or preventive detention and
supervision. It might be convenient, but it would be unjust. Subjectivism's
injustice is further manifest in its violation of legality stemming from its
bending of language, its inherent vagueness, and its radical incompleteness.
Having concluded that there ought be no liability for attempts absent the
imposition of an immediate objective risk, it remained to specify objective risk.
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This I did m the second part of the Article, first through the principle that there
is no risk absent someone who is potentially at risk, and second through the
services of an ideal observer. The ideal observer is a method of specifying the
conditions of repetition that would ideally be used to generate the risk
"statistics." The ideal observer is omnipresent up to the act in question, has
access to any post-act statements available to the jury, but is limited to
observations at the macro-level. An observer so characterized will define a
notion of risk appropriate to an imposition theory, as risk of imposition ought
to be understood in criminal practice.
The resulting theory is both simpler in application than more subjective
theories, and, more importantly, gets the cases right. That it gets the cases right
may not be obvious at first. It will become clearer if you confront and revise
your own initial intuitions on the cases in terms of your normative theory of
criminal liability, while holding that theory subject to simultaneous review and
revision in the light of the arguments of this Article. 98
98 RAWLS, supra note 61, at 20-21, 48-51.
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